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How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust 
Company to Secure a Family Fortune 
Iris J. Goodwin∗ 
[H]e had started a story once that began, “The very rich are dif-
ferent from you and me.”  . . . [S]ome one . . . said . . . , Yes, they 
have more money. 
 Ernest Hemingway, The Snows of Kilimanjaro
1
 
 
We’re not a family; we’re a firm. 
 King George VI, about the British Royal Family
2
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is about family trust companies and the way they are 
used by very wealthy families to preserve great fortunes.  The prov-
ince of the megarich (who remain very much upon the American 
landscape, the recent economic crisis notwithstanding
3
), the family 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law.  J.D., New York 
University School of Law; Ph.D., Columbia University.  The author wishes to thank a 
number of people, many of whom read the article in various stages of gestation, and 
all of whom were generous with comments or encouragement:  Amy Hess, Tom Da-
vies and Jennifer  Hendricks, colleagues at the University of Tennessee College of 
Law; Melanie Leslie of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Mary Louise Fellows 
of Seattle University School of Law; Angela Carmella and Marc Poirier of Seton Hall 
University School of Law; Richard Hyland of Rutgers School of Law–Camden;, and 
Laura Rosenbury and Mae Quinn of the Washington University of School of Law.  
Appreciation is also expressed to Jeffrey Cooper of Quinnipiac University School of 
Law and other participants in the AALS Trusts & Estates Section Meeting, CHANGING 
LAW:  EVALUATING LEGAL TRENDS IN TRUSTS AND ESTATES LAW, Jan. 9, 2010, in New Or-
leans, La.,, where this paper was a featured presentation.  Finally, Al King, Pierce 
McDowell, and Matt Tobin of the South Dakota Trust Company provided invaluable 
research materials.    
 1 ERNEST HEMINGWAY, The Snows of Kilimanjaro, in THE SNOWS OF KILIMANJARO AND 
OTHER STORIES 3, 23 (1995). 
 2 THE HUTCHINSON ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BRITISH HISTORY 147 (Simon 
Hall et al. eds., 1998). 
 3 While the recent economic crisis has been consequential for the very rich (as 
for everyone else) and many great fortunes currently reflect the decline in the mar-
ket, many of the America’s wealthiest families remain among the nation’s—and the 
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trust company is generally thought to be a vehicle for families with a 
net worth of at least $200 million.
4
  While the family trust company 
has long been important in securing the fortunes of some of the na-
tion’s wealthiest families, the academic bar has paid it scant attention.  
This Article aims to redress this longstanding oversight, especially in 
light of recent changes in the law that make these entities far more 
accessible to the very wealthy.
5
 
The purpose of this Article is not, however, merely to attend to 
the particulars of these new laws that so effectively facilitate estab-
lishment of these entities.  The tendency of all lawyers (including le-
gal scholars) is to examine laws seriatim, one by one, rather than pur-
suing the combined effects of rules drawn from diverse areas of the 
law—thus discerning neither the extraordinary burdens of such 
combined effects nor the opportunities created by layering the bene-
fits of laws not intended to be used in concert.  Accordingly, the real 
significance of new laws affording the very wealthy ready access to the 
family trust company cannot be apprehended if these rules are 
treated in isolation.  The intent of this Article is to examine—indeed 
to expose—the role of the family trust company as the masterstroke 
in a series of aggressive planning techniques (tax-driven and other-
wise) that are used by the very wealthy to secure and grow a fortune 
for untold generations to come.  The family trust company positions 
a wealthy family to exploit the elimination of the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities in certain states to create perpetual trusts, to “leverage” ex-
emptions from or credits against federal transfer tax applicable to the 
transfers into such trusts, and, most importantly, to make the most of 
new laws under which the determination of investment risk for such 
trusts has become as much art as science. 
But further, what must also be appreciated is that these new laws 
facilitating the establishment of family trust companies (with the at-
tendant opportunities to exploit other laws) are by some lights 
enormously consequential for the health of a democratic polity.  It 
 
world’s—most financially fortunate people.  See generally Mathew Miller & Duncan 
Greenberg, The Forbes 400, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2009, at 44 (discussing both the increase 
and decrease in the net worth of the United States’ richest individuals).  “The rich 
haven’t gotten richer—or poorer—this year.”  Id. at 44. 
 4 Pierce H. McDowell III, Family Owned Private Trust Companies, ABA TR. & 
INVESTMENTS, May–June 2008, at 42, 44. 
 5 See Carol A. Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family 
Offices: What Every Estate Planner Needs to Know, in SOPHISTICATED ESTATE PLANNING 
TECHNIQUES 675, 689–92 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Sept. 4–5, 2008) (discussing re-
cent changes, uses, advantages, and disadvantages of family trust companies), availa-
ble at WL SP020 ALI-ABA 675.  
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has long been a commonplace of democratic theory that, while de-
mocracy is largely immune to some degree of material difference 
within a polity, intransigent and radical differences in means are 
problematic.
6
  For this reason, the dissipation of great fortunes—
whether from the pressure of taxation or due to other causes—has 
been viewed as salubrious in a democratic polity.
7
  “Shirtsleeves to 
shirtsleeves in three (or so) generations” is more than a proverb; it is 
arguably an operating condition of a healthy democracy, ensuring 
relative equality over time, a similar vulnerability to the vicissitudes of 
fortune.
8
  If the family trust company succeeds where advisers claim it 
can, however, great fortunes will cease to dissipate, and what many 
believe to be a background condition of a thriving democracy will be 
(at least for the United States) a thing of the past.
9
 
Furthermore, as part and parcel of its implications for democra-
cy, the family trust company understood as a crucial element in an 
architecture of complex planning techniques provides rich social 
commentary.  In some of the literature surrounding the family trust 
company, this entity is offered up not only as the keystone in an edi-
fice of diverse legal rules, an apparatus to hold and manage various 
types of wealth, but also as a central locus of family activity.  In particu-
lar, some advisors to the very wealthy recognize the family trust com-
 
 6 The locus classicus of this argument is probably Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Con-
trat Social.  Speaking of the necessary conditions of a democracy, Rousseau counsels 
“a large measure of equality in rank and fortune, without which equality of rights and 
authority cannot long subsist [and] little or no luxury—for luxury either comes of 
riches or makes them necessary; it corrupts at once rich and poor, the rich by posses-
sion and the poor by covetousness . . . .”  See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 58–59 (G. D. H. Cole ed. & trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1913) 
(1762); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43–44 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & 
James McClellan eds., 2001) (discussing the “latent causes of faction” that are “sown 
in the nature of man”). 
 7 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971).  Rawls defends inheritance 
taxes not as a means to “raise revenue . . . but [instead, to] gradually and continually 
. . . correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power detri-
mental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.”  Id.  
 8 See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 50 (J.P. Mayer ed., 
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835) (describing how the seeds of 
aristocracy have never been sown into American culture); see also B. Douglas Bern-
heim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?, in 1 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 113, 121–
32 (Lawrence J. Summers ed., 1987); Michael J. Boskin, An Economists’ Perspective on 
Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY 
REPORT 56, 65 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (suggesting a proper role of trans-
fer taxes is to prevent “extreme concentrations of wealth from being passed from gen-
eration to generation”); Gary Solon, Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United 
States, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393–94, 403–05 (1992). 
 9 Boskin, supra note 8, at 65–66. 
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pany as a venue for what is termed “financial reproduction.”
10
  The 
family trust company can create a place (the suggestion is made) 
where the older generation can tutor the younger in wealth preserva-
tion consistent with the family’s particular ethos about money and in-
vesting.  As each generation (operating within the trust company) 
embraces this ethos to preserve the family fortune, each generation 
becomes quite self-consciously identified with its wealth, cognizant of 
its privilege, and able—even eager—to manage its unique circums-
tances into the future.  Thus the family trust company serves not 
merely to frame the family’s financial life but to frame the lives of the 
wealthy broadly understood.  As the family trust company is explored 
along with those complex planning techniques for which it can be 
crucial, the impression is inescapable: the lives of the rich are as 
much informed by their extraordinary wealth as the lives of the poor 
are by their poverty. 
Part II of this Article examines recent changes in the laws in 
some states that allow for ease of set up and operation of a trust com-
pany serving a related group of people.  This Part examines both the 
“lightly regulated” and the unregulated versions of the family trust 
company, highlighting their advantages and disadvantages. 
Part III presents tax-minimization strategies that are commonly 
utilized in conjunction with the establishment of the family trust 
company to virtually eliminate the transfer tax liability when families 
move assets from the initial wealth-creating generation to later gen-
erations.  In particular, we consider the “Note-Sale,” a strategy used to 
“leverage” exemptions from or credits against federal transfer tax, al-
lowing a family to move tens of millions of dollars into trust with little 
to no transfer tax liability.  Further, if this trust is established in a 
“non-perpetuities” jurisdiction (something readily accomplished giv-
en that those states that allow the creation of a family trust company 
have also eliminated the Rule Against Perpetuities
11
), the wealth de-
nied to the federal fisc (along with the rest of the family fortune) can 
remain safely stowed in trust to serve successive generations of the 
family forever. 
But these families are not merely interested in transferring great 
wealth into perpetual trust in ways that ensure that their wealth will 
escape transfer tax both at the time of transfer and later.  These fami-
lies are also concerned about what becomes of their fortunes after 
 
 10 See Linda C. McClain, Family Constitutions and the (New) Constitution of the Family, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 861 (2006) (terming this “social reproduction”). 
 11 See infra Part III.A. 
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they are placed in trust.  Part IV presents what is probably the most 
significant advantage afforded to the very wealthy by the family trust 
company: the opportunity to serve as trustee, and in that capacity, to 
continue to determine its own investment risk.  Until the  advent of 
the family trust company, provisions of the tax regime made it prob-
lematic for the family to employ strategies such as the “Note-Sale” 
and then name a family member to serve as trustee of the trusts ne-
cessitated by these strategies.
12
  These families have typically had to 
resort to banks and other institutional trustees—most of which are 
inclined to invest conservatively, missing opportunities for returns ra-
ther than put the portfolio in jeopardy.  This has not made these fam-
ilies happy.  But further, about fifteen years ago, the law governing 
the investment of trust assets became more liberal as a result of the 
Prudent Investor statute, which made the determination of the risk 
profile appropriate to any portfolio in trust as much an art as a 
science.  While institutional trustees may still be inclined to invest 
more conservatively, a case can now be made that, if the account is 
large enough and the horizon long enough, even highly speculative 
investments (with potential for enormous returns) can be appropri-
ate for property in trust.  Once the family establishes a family trust 
company, the family, serving as its own trustee, is poised to accept 
Prudent Investor’s invitation to invest aggressively.  These trusts, 
which are filled with wealth that has never been and will never be sub-
jected to transfer tax, potentially become investment juggernauts. 
Whatever control of investing a family may acquire by establish-
ing a family trust company, this control will be useless if the family 
cannot muster from generation to generation the financial acumen 
and the discipline to make state-of-the-art investment decisions.  Part 
V examines the family trust company as a venue for what has been 
termed “financial parenting.”  In this process, members of a wealthy 
family discern and embrace the magnitude of their privilege as well as 
its financial underpinnings—and acquire an “identity apart” from the 
rest of society.
13
  If the operation of a family trust company requires 
certain skills and attitudes, the trust company itself can serve as a fo-
rum in which education in these skills and attitudes can take place.
14
  
 
 12 See McDowell, supra note 4, at 43–45.  
 13  See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 277 (stating that distribution of wealth can is an es-
sential factor in  “prevent[ing] concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value 
of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity”).   
 14 See JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY WEALTH—KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY:  HOW 
FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL, AND FINANCIAL 
ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS 117–19 (rev. and expanded ed. 2004) (discussing the com-
peting demands on and skill required of a trustee). 
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But more importantly, the sustained process of gathering together for 
the purpose of preserving and growing wealth encourages families to 
discern and embrace the privileges of great wealth in such a way that 
the family trust company can only be privilege-sustaining, indeed pri-
vilege-enhancing. 
Finally, in the wake of the recent economic turmoil, we might 
think that anyone with an entrepreneurial mindset would feel chas-
tened, particularly given that many speculators have suffered enorm-
ous losses, and speculative excess is what—so many say—brought the 
U.S. economy to its knees.  Many of the wealthy have seen a decline 
in the value of their holdings like everyone else.  Be that as it may, 
with pundits disagreeing about the effectiveness of various antidotes 
to the crisis and no one confidently foreseeing the light at the end of 
the tunnel, the time could not be riper for the wealthy to want to 
manage their own risk, to protect against further downside, and to 
position portfolios to take advantage of early opportunities that will 
appear when the U.S. economy starts to recover.
15
  And this is no less 
the case where the property is held in trust. 
II. THE MODERN FAMILY TRUST COMPANY 
Continuing to invest the family fortune after it has been trans-
ferred into trust has long held significant appeal for wealthy families 
and, for well over a century, family trust companies have been used as 
a means to this end.  Family trust companies first appeared in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
16
  At the time, they were or-
ganized as state-chartered and state-regulated banks under the same 
laws and regulatory requirements that would govern any state-
chartered trust company serving the public.
17
  In our era, a family 
 
 15 Indeed, for many very wealthy people this economic crisis represents an oppor-
tunity of sorts.  With asset values reduced, assets may be transferred within the family 
at substantially reduced value transfer tax costs.  See Deborah L. Jacobs, As Economy 
Declines, Donors Rethink Estate Planning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at F27. 
 16 See, e.g., Bessemer Trust, Our Heritage, http://www.bessemertrust.com/ 
portal/site/bessemernew/ (follow “Heritage” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).   
 17 In fact, a number of these earlier family trust companies have grown into bank-
ing institutions that serve a larger public.  Created to serve the family of Henry 
Phipps, Bessemer Trust opened its doors to the public in 1974.  Id.  Pitcairn Family 
Office was established to manage the fortune of the descendants of John Pitcairn, co-
founder of what is now PPG Industries.  Pitcairn Family Office, Sustaining Genera-
tional Wealth, http://www.pitcairn.com/pitcairn.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).  
The firm opened its doors to other wealthy families in 1987, providing (among other 
financial services) fiduciary services.  Id.  Rockefeller Trust was established over 125 
years ago by John D. Rockefeller to manage money for his descendants.  See Rockefel-
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trust company can still be organized this way,
18
 but recent changes in 
the law (at least in some states) make this unnecessary. 
A. The New Regulatory Regimes 
While a wealthy family can still create a national bank regulated 
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or a state bank re-
gulated by state banking authorities,
19
 it is now also possible to create 
an unregulated or a “lightly regulated” trust company if the entity is 
limited in its purpose to serving as trustee of trusts benefiting a group 
of related people.
20
  In one group of states, legislatures have respond-
ed with new and separate private trust company charters so that trust 
companies serving only a related group of people can be subject to 
“lighter” requirements than those imposed on trust companies serv-
ing the general public.
21
  In certain other states, liberalization of the 
law has occurred by simply allowing a limited-purpose corporation to 
act as a trust company under the general statutes of the state.
22
  Some 
states make available both options—light regulation or no regula-
tion.
23
  Whichever scheme a family elects, these innovations at the 
 
ler & Co., Inc., About Rockefeller & Co., http://www.rockco.com/who-we-are/our-
history.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
 18 The entity is unlikely to be organized as a national bank or a state bank, unless 
the family plans to effectively open a business and to take deposits and offer other 
conventional banking services.  See Harrington & Harding, supra note 5, at 692–93. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 689.  Interestingly, states do not always specify what is meant by the re-
quirement of a “related group of people.”  See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-1 
(Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. Ct. R. 09-09).  But see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 392:40-a(I)(a) (Westlaw through ch. 1 of 2010 Sess.). 
 21 States permitting a “lightly regulated” family trust company include Alaska, 
ALASKA STAT. § 06.26.200 (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. & 2009 Spec. Sess.), De-
laware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 773, 774, 779 (2007), New Hampshire, N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 392.40-a, 392.40-b, and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-4.  
See also DELOITTE DEV. LLC, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
FOR WEALTHY FAMILIES 2 (2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/ 
DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_tax_PrivateTrustCompanies 
_070809.pdf (discussing jurisdictions allowing regulated private trust companies).   
 22 States permitting an unregulated family trust company include Virginia, see VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-32.1 to 6.1-32.10 (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 2009 Spec. 
Sess. I), Colorado, and Wyoming.  See DELOITTE DEV. LLC, supra note 21, at 2.  States 
permitting an unregulated family trust company include Virginia.  . 
 23 States allowing both include Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 172 §§ 5, 
9A (West, Westlaw through ch. 39 of the 2010 Ann. Sess.), Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 669.080(1)(n)(2) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through Apr. 2009), and Wyoming, 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-5-101 to 104 (LEXIS through 2009 Gen. Sess.).  See also 
DELOITTE DEV. LLC, supra note 21, at 2 (discussing state regulation of private trust 
companies). 
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state level have reduced formation and operation costs for these new 
entities.
24
 
1. The “Lightly Regulated” Family Trust Company 
The “lightly regulated” family trust company is still chartered by 
the state and subject to state supervision, though not on a level com-
parable to a bank or trust company serving the general public.  The 
organizing documents must, however, limit the purpose of the entity 
to the provision of fiduciary services to members of a family or a 
group of related people and, further, prohibit the trust company 
from soliciting business from the public at large.
25
  Even a so-called 
“lightly regulated” family trust company will usually have to have a 
minimum number of directors
26
 (and perhaps one or more directors 
domiciled in the state), a minimum number of board meetings per 
year,
27
 a physical office in the state,
28
 and a minimum number of em-
ployees.
29
  Further, there must be in place a formalized risk-
management discipline, which state regulators will periodically re-
view; this discipline can include bylaws, a policy manual (setting 
 
 24 Harrington & Harding, supra note 5, at 689.  
 25 With respect to family trust companies, especially where unregulated but even 
where lightly regulated at the state level, some advisors have been concerned that 
these entities could be subject to registration with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (1940 Act or the Act).  See, 
e.g., id. at 694.  Because these entities offer trustee services and investment advice, 
some advisors have worried that they are potentially subject to the 1940 Act.  See id. at 
681–82.  Furthermore, because they are not regulated by state banking regulators to 
any meaningful degree, they would not qualify under the “bank” exemption under 
the Act.  Cf. id. at 691 (“A [private trust company] may be exempt from registration 
as investment advisers with the SEC . . . if it is a regulated trust company.”).  This 
would mean that, while changes in state law would exempt these entities from one 
form of regulation (i.e., state banking regulation), this exemption would subject 
them to another form of regulation (i.e., regulation under the 1940 Act).  Id. at 693–
94.  In 2007, upon the representation that the family trust company organized as a 
limited liability company under Wyoming law did not hold itself out to the public as 
an investment adviser, the SEC issued an order of exemption under Section 
202(a)(11)(F) of the Act.  See In re Gates Capital Partners, LLC, Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 Release No. 2599 (Mar. 20, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules/ia/2007/ia-
2599.pdf.  
 26 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661.135 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through Apr. 2009); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 384:3(IV) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through ch. 327 of 2009 Sess.); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-13 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. Ct. R. 09-
09). 
 27 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661.165; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 384:7; S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 51A-6A-15. 
 28 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 660.015(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-58. 
 29 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 51A-6A-31 to -32 (minimum number of em-
ployees is one and state examinations occur every eighteen months).  
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forth, among other things, a committee structure and decision rules 
for those committees), annual reports,
30
 and appropriate record 
keeping.
31
  Capital requirements vary by state but are universally 
modest, with some states as low as $250,000
32
 and others up to $2 mil-
lion.
33
  Some states imposing lighter capital requirements, such as 
South Dakota and New Hampshire, also require a surety bond of $1 
million.
34
 
2. The Unregulated Trust Company 
Some states offer an even more permissive regime.  In these 
states, a state-issued charter is not required to establish a family trust 
company, nor is the state required to exercise subsequent regulatory 
oversight.
35
  States that allow family trust companies to form without 
any regulation typically permit the family to create a limited-purpose 
corporation that then acts as a trust company under the general sta-
tutes of the state.
36
  The organizing documents—as was the case with 
the lightly regulated regime—must limit the purpose of the entity to 
the provision of fiduciary services to members of a family and, fur-
ther, prohibit the trust company from soliciting business from the 
public at large.
37
  For entities organized under these regimes, there 
are usually no capital requirements.
38
  The simpler procedures re-
quired for organization, the absence of periodic examinations, and 
the absence of capital requirements allow a family trust company to 
be quickly and easily established and also make it less expensive to 
operate.
39
 
 
 30 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665.105; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392:40-b(III); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-34.   
 31 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-30. 
 32 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 745 (2007). 
 33 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.40-a(II), 392.25(I); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-
19. 
 34 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.40-a(II), 392.25(I); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-
6A-19; Harrington & Harding, supra note 5, at 709. 
 35 See generally DELOITTE DEV. LLC, supra note 21, at 2 (indicating that Colorado, 
New Hampshire, and Virginia recognize unregulated family trust companies).   
 36 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-32.30:2(A), 6.1-32.30:3 (LEXIS through 2009 
Reg. Sess. & 2009 Spec. Sess. I).  
 37 Id. at § 6.1-32.30:2(D). 
 38 See Harrington & Harding, supra note 5, at 709 (indicating that unregulated 
family trusts in Massachusetts, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming do not require a 
minimum capital amount). 
 39 Id. 
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B. Organizing the Family Trust Company: Type of Association and 
Location 
Creation of a family trust company begins with a determination 
as to the type of business association and its governing structure.  The 
family must also decide the state in which the family trust company 
will be organized and operated.  These decisions are crucial if the 
family is to realize the potential of the family trust company, first as a 
significant component within an advanced tax planning strategy and 
later as a vehicle by which to secure the family fortune into the fu-
ture. 
1. Organization and Governance 
A variety of considerations can drive the decision as to the type 
of business entity to be used.  Since states that have liberalized their 
laws with respect to the formation of family trust companies usually 
permit these entities to be organized as limited liability companies, 
most families will organize as such, although some still may form a 
corporation.
40
  To take advantage of those state statutes that have re-
cently liberalized the regulatory framework applicable to family trust 
companies, the entity is typically organized for the limited purpose of 
providing trust services to a particular family or group of related indi-
viduals.
41
 
Once a decision is made with respect to the type of business as-
sociation to be used, the family must put in place a governance struc-
ture so that the family can, through the various administrative arms 
of the trust company, effectively control the investment of trust funds, 
among other things.
42
  The ownership interest is usually vested in in-
 
 40 A partnership would not be used because the entity would terminate when one 
of the partners died.  See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(2)(i), 6 U.L.A. 189 (1997).  This 
would defeat one of the purposes of creating an entity to serve as trustee rather than 
relying upon an individual. 
 41 Ronald D. Aucutt, McGuire Woods LLP, The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust 
Companies and Family Offices (Mar. 8–9, 2008) 2–3 (outline of remarks on file with 
author). 
 42 See id. at 5–9 (discussing how private trust companies must be individually de-
signed).  While control of investing the trust corpus rarely has adverse tax conse-
quences for the family, control of distributions of income or principal by family 
members to family members can have disastrous transfer tax consequences.  See id. at 
9–10 (discussing the tax considerations of the family trust company).  Because the 
desire to control distributions is usually not the primary reason that a family estab-
lishes a family trust company, decision making within the family trust company can 
usually be structured so that adverse tax consequences are avoided.  See, e.g., I.R.S. 
Notice 2008-63, 2008-31 I.R.B. 261.  
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dividual family members.
43
  Family members also serve on the board 
of directors.
44
  The board can also include outside advisors of long 
standing.
45
  To the extent that the applicable state statute requires 
one or more directors to be a resident of the state where the trust 
company has been created and where it will operate, local attorneys 
and other advisers can be named.  In any event, states that permit a 
family to create a “lightly regulated” or unregulated family trust com-
pany also permit the family to control the board, the necessary pres-
ence of others notwithstanding.
46
 
2. Caveat: Liability 
For the family that objects to bureaucratic red tape, the unregu-
lated family trust company has appeal, at least at first glance.  Ease of 
formation and operation aside, however, another reason for creating 
a family trust company is to overcome one of the drawbacks in nam-
ing an individual as trustee, that is, the personal liability of the trus-
tee.
47
  If the trustee is organized as a corporation or a limited liability 
company, then the trustee’s liability should be limited to the amount 
of any required formation capital and the value of any surety bond.  
So, for example, in South Dakota, where capital in the amount of 
$200,000 is required for formation along with a $1 million surety 
bond, liability would be limited to $1.2 million.
48
  This is the case, 
however, only if the corporate veil is not pierced.  If the veil is 
pierced, then those members of the family deemed the principals are 
 
 43 See Aucutt, supra note 41, at 9.  Trusts established for the benefit of family 
members can also hold some or all of the ownership interest in a family trust compa-
ny.  Id.  This is a further step that, among other things, removes the ownership inter-
est from family members’ estates.  Indeed, it is not uncommon for the trusts for 
which the family trust company is the trustee to own the family trust company.  See, 
e.g., RICHARD R. DAVIS, THE PHIPPS FAMILY AND THE BESSEMER COMPANIES 16–17 (2007).  
This circularity may appear to present questions with respect to fiduciary duty and 
enforceability, as this structure renders the beneficiaries themselves, through their 
beneficial interests in the trust, economically identical to the trustee.  While there 
are elements of irony here, in truth the situation is not fundamentally different from 
the situation where individual family members are the trustees of trusts benefiting 
the family.   
 44 Aucutt, supra note 41, at 3. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See Harrington & Harding, supra note 5, at 689. 
 47 Id. at 691. 
 48 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-19 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. 
Ct. R. 09-09). 
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potentially liable.
49
  Thus, even a family that dislikes red tape may de-
cide that some degree of regulation and organizational niceties such 
as bylaws, a policy manual, a committee structure with formalized de-
cision-making processes, and good record keeping lend a crucial 
element to the entity in the form of organizational integrity.
50
 
3. Trust Company State Situs 
Because not every state allows a family to establish a modern 
family trust company,
51
 obviously the entity must be organized and 
operated in a state where the law has been liberalized, unless the ent-
ity is to be organized under one of the legal regimes governing those 
trust companies serving the public.
52
  The state in which the trust 
company is organized and operated is important for other reasons as 
well, however.  The situs of the trust company will also supply the situs 
and governing law for any trusts established by the family where the 
trust company is named as trustee.
53
  If the family trust company is to 
be the masterstroke in a sophisticated estate plan, it is crucial that it 
be located in a state where the law is optimal for the realization of all 
aspects of the plan.  The importance of state situs for purposes of di-
verse elements of the plan will become evident in Part III.  At this 
juncture, suffice it to note only that fortunately for the families un-
dertaking these complex estate plans, many of the states that have li-
beralized their laws with respect to forming privately owned, family 
trust companies have also changed their laws governing the creation 
and administration of trusts.
54
 
 
 49 Of course, by virtue of the family component of these trusts, the beneficiaries 
suing for breach of trust will be the children, siblings, cousins, nieces, and nephews 
of those serving in a decision-making capacity in the trust.  
 50 See Harrington & Harding, supra note 5, at 693 (identifying favorable characte-
ristics of a national or state-chartered, regulated limited purpose trust company that 
may enhance organizational integrity). 
 51 See, e.g., id. at 693–94. 
 52  Cf. supra note 17 (providing examples of trust companies serving the public).  
 53 See, e.g., Harrington & Harding, supra note 5, at 695 (noting that considera-
tions such as favorable trust and property law are important for families deciding 
where to form their regulated private trust companies).   
 54 Id. at 689, 694–95 (listing the most common states used for private trust com-
pany formation and detailing jurisdiction considerations that make the particular 
states attractive to families forming such companies).  Trusts for which the family 
trust company is the successor trustee are another question.  The family trust com-
pany cannot create a nexus with respect to all important legal issues for a trust that 
names as initial trustee a person domiciled in another jurisdiction or another trust 
company located in another jurisdiction.  See id. at 690 (noting that “a trust may not 
contain flexible trustee succession provisions”).   
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C. Alternative Fiduciaries: “Big Banks” and Private Individuals 
Families of extraordinary wealth would almost always
55
 be wel-
come clients of existing banks and trust companies that, for a fee, 
readily serve as fiduciaries for members of the public.  Or, in the al-
ternative, these families could avoid using a big bank by naming an 
individual as trustee, either a person expert in fiduciary matters such 
as a lawyer specializing in trusts and estates, or even someone without 
professional expertise, perhaps a family member.  Either of these 
choices would allow a family to avoid the burdens of establishing and 
then operating a trust company of its own.  Both a big bank trustee 
and an individual fiduciary have significant limitations, however, for 
people with considerable wealth who want to provide for multiple 
generations of their families by transferring their property into long-
term trusts. 
1. Alternatives: “Big Banks” 
Big banks now typically offer their wealthier clients state-of-the-
art estate planning assistance, along with structures and services con-
sonant with changes in the law particularly attractive to the very weal-
thy eager to transfer their property into trust.  For example, these in-
stitutions commonly have subsidiaries in states that allow for the 
creation of perpetual trusts.
56
  Further, consistent with the Prudent 
Investor Act, these institutions often offer a platform of cutting-edge 
investments appropriate to the risk profile of large privately held for-
tunes, even those in trust.
57
 
For families establishing privately owned, family trust companies, 
however, these available structures and services are not enough.  With 
respect to state situs, for example, not only is the possibility of estab-
lishing a perpetual trust at issue for these families, but there are other 
provisions of state law that can also be advantageous in establishing a 
trust.  One state may allow perpetual trusts, but another may allow 
these plus have a more attractive law with respect to asset protection.  
 
 55 Certain banks and conventional trust companies are reluctant to accept in 
trust volatile or hard-to-manage assets such as real estate, operating companies, or a 
non-diversified portfolio consisting in an ownership interest in either a closely held 
company or a publicly traded one where the family does not want the portfolio diver-
sified.  See id. at 689. 
 56 See, e.g., Ralph Engel & Al W. King III, The Dynasty Trust, CPA J., Sept. 1996, at 
16, 18, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1996/0996/features/ 
DynastyTrust.htm. 
 57 See, e.g., Wilmington Trust, Investment Choices, 
https://www.wilmingtontrust.com/wtcom/index.jsp?section=WAS&fileid=114606254
0611. 
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Prudent Investor statutes also vary state by state.  In establishing a 
trust, these families want to elect the state situs that is optimal for 
them, not one determined by a large institution to be optimal for its 
client base. 
Perhaps even more important, with respect to investments,  
these families want to continue to invest their property even after it 
has been placed in trust, notwithstanding any platform of sophisti-
cated vehicles offered by existing banks and trust companies.  A trus-
tee has a duty not only to invest but to conserve the assets of the trust 
in accordance with statutorily mandated fiduciary standards.  Any in-
vestment program subject to fiduciary standards must look to the in-
terests of income beneficiaries and remaindermen, both born and 
unborn.
58
  This is a tall order, and a big-bank trustee is mindful that, 
for any risk profile established by it, the standard of review looks to 
common fiduciary investment practice.
59
  This means that banks and 
trust companies serving the larger public are generally loathe to in-
vest an account more aggressively than they anticipate their competi-
tors would invest, given the risk profile.
60
  Also, while trustees are not 
required to guarantee results as they invest a trust portfolio, the duty 
of care encourages these institutions to attend to deliberative 
processes carefully recorded, as a prudent process is usually a good 
defense to a bad result.
61
 
There are opportunity costs, however, attendant upon conven-
ing committees and reaching decisions in accordance with procedur-
al dictates, and there are those who believe such tentativeness is ulti-
mately unproductive, especially where the account is of significant 
size and the time horizon is that of the perpetual trust.  Many families 
 
 58 David S. Prince, Sutton’s Law and Economics Applied to the Professional Fiduciary: 
Helping the Trustee Avoid Predatory Litigants, 119 BANKING L.J. 17, 34–35 (2002); Su-
zanne M. Trimble, Life’s Hard Choices: Why Choose a Corporate Trustee?, CBA REC., Sept. 
2000, at 44, 44 (2000).  
 59 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
656 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, The Contractarian Basis] (explaining that the stan-
dard of prudent administration is “a reasonableness norm, comparable to the rea-
sonable person rule of tort”); John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and 
the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 644 (1996) [hereinafter Langbein, 
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act] (stating that the “standard of prudent investing was 
the standard of industry practice—what other trustees similarly situated were 
doing”). 
 60 See, e.g., Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 59, at 649–50 
(discussing how the Prudent Investor Act instructs investors to closely analyze risk 
and return objectives closely in every investment decision for the given beneficiary).    
 61 See Prince, supra note 58, at 30–35 (detailing the importance of careful docu-
mentation and thorough record-keeping for fiduciaries so that they may avoid litiga-
tion).     
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establishing privately owned, family trust companies want to be free 
of such constraints.  These families are seeking to ensure full exploi-
tation of any Prudent Investor statute by developing their own more 
nuanced risk profile to govern investment decisions for their proper-
ty placed in trust and want, where possible, to be free of bureaucratic 
red tape so that they can turn on a dime in making investment deci-
sions.
62
  In short, these families want a trustee that is willing and able 
to facilitate the realization of goals consistent with their own risk as-
sessment. 
2. Alternatives: Individual Trustees 
Of course, these families could simply name an individual as 
trustee.
63
  A lawyer with expertise in fiduciary matters could be 
named, but an individual without expertise could also be chosen.  
But to the extent that these families are seeking to establish their 
trusts in a state with statutes optimally advantageous for their particu-
lar purposes, an individual—expert or otherwise—cannot provide the 
nexus necessary to create situs unless he or she is domiciled in the de-
sired state.
64
  Further, even if an appropriate individual can be located 
in the desired state, individuals go on vacation, become incapaci-
tated, die, and resign.  This fact is usually of modest moment in a 
 
 62 And to the extent a big bank might be willing to look beyond its own invest-
ment platform to accommodate a particular family’s investment interest, any invest-
ment direction would still be subject to the bank’s deliberative process—red-tape 
that these families want to avoid.  
 63 Naming a family member can have deleterious tax consequences, especially if 
he or she is either the grantor of the trust or a beneficiary of it.  See infra note 79. 
 64 For aggressive estate planning, establishing trust situs in a state with advanta-
geous laws is key.  To access a particular law (which will then govern the validity of 
the instrument and the subsequent administration of the trust), a trust must have a 
sufficient nexus with the desired jurisdiction.  EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 21.3 (4th ed. 2004).  A sufficient nexus will give rise to situs so that, under 
choice-of-law rules, judicial venue notwithstanding, the trust will be deemed go-
verned by the laws of the desired jurisdiction.  Arguably, nexus is a creature of gran-
tor intent, meaning that a direction in the trust instrument with respect to governing 
law should suffice to establish nexus and thus situs.  Id. §§ 21.1, 21.3.  This rule is sub-
ject to the significant caveat, however, that the rule at issue not be at odds with a 
strong contrary local policy.  Id. § 21.1.  The continued presence of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities in a particular venue could present such an important contrary policy.  
Therefore, advisors (cognizant of how important governing law is in an aggressive 
estate plan) tend to err on the side of conservatism in securing situs for a trust.  They 
thus look to case law determining situs where the grantor provides no direction in 
the trust instrument.  Accordingly, to secure the validity of the trust, they secure suf-
ficient nexus by naming as initial trustee an individual domiciled in or a bank autho-
rized to conduct trust business in the desired jurisdiction.  Id. § 21.3.  To secure the 
desired administrative regime, the instrument also directs that the trust be adminis-
tered in this jurisdiction on an ongoing basis.  Id. §§ 21.3, 21.6. 
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garden-variety trust of moderate size, established to last one or two 
lifetimes.  In the case of a perpetual trust holding a fortune in cut-
ting-edge investments, however, such limitations can be consequen-
tial indeed.  If an individual trustee is contemplated, what will be 
needed (vacations notwithstanding) is an unbroken line of succession 
from one honest, experienced, informed, and (ideally) astute indi-
vidual to the next, with each residing in the appropriate jurisdiction.  
And ultimately, this succession of individual fiduciaries must poten-
tially serve with respect to multiple trusts, all with slightly different ra-
tionales. 
Further, given the complexity of the provisions in a typical per-
petual trust and the challenges that inhere in investing a portfolio of 
great size, an individual trustee, even one with professional expertise, 
must commonly resort to a bank or other financial services provider 
or a collection of providers to serve as agent for the trustee in any 
number of capacities.
65
  This does not mean that the individual trus-
tee will delegate fiduciary responsibility, as he or she always retains a 
duty to monitor an agent’s performance.
66
  Nevertheless, when an in-
dividual trustee is named to serve alone, investment advice, custody, 
and sometimes even record keeping and tax return preparation are 
commonly contracted out to large corporate institutions.
67
 
Finally, trustees are personally liable for breach of fiduciary du-
ty,
68
 something that is always of concern but is particularly critical 
here where the plan contemplates a relatively aggressive posture on 
the part of the fiduciary with respect to investments.  In naming an 
individual as trustee many families will attempt to redress this vulne-
rability by including an indemnification provision in the trust instru-
ment, especially since individual trustees often find insurance cover-
age limited or unavailable.
69
  Under current law, however, the legal 
force of such indemnifications is uncertain, with many commentators 
arguing that, to be binding, these must be limited in the trust agree-
ment to particular assets or specified situations.
70
  In addition, the in-
tractable problem of personal liability here makes for yet another ob-
 
 65 Id. at 17.  
 66 Iris J. Goodwin & Pierce McDowell, Delegation of Fiduciary Investment Responsibili-
ty: Trustees Explore the Once Taboo, TR. & EST., Mar. 1999, at 8, 10; Al W. King III & 
Pierce H. McDowell III, Delegated vs. Directed Trusts, TR. & EST., July 2006, at 26, 27. 
 67 See, e.g., Harrington & Harding, supra note 5, at 689–91. 
 68 Langbein, The Contractarian Basis, supra note 59, at 656. 
 69 Kozusko, supra note 64, at 19.  
 70 See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and 
Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2728 (2006). 
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stacle to finding individuals who are willing to serve as trustees, not 
only initially but successively.  In contrast, the liabilities of a family 
trust company—and of any employee serving there—are more easily 
managed.
71
 
Thus, a family trust company avoids the perceived opportunity 
costs inherent in the use of a big bank as trustee, as well as other limi-
tations, such as potential liability, attendant upon naming an individ-
ual.  The family trust company—itself a corporate entity—then be-
comes an attractive alternative, blending the structural advantages of 
a corporate trustee with the discretionary latitude of an individual 
one.
72
 
III. VALUATION ALCHEMY: CREATING THE TRUST CORPUS 
To justify an aggressive posture, the constraints of fiduciary duty 
notwithstanding, the trustee must look to the totality of facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the trust.  And the case for investing aggres-
sively is better made where the corpus is considerable and the term of 
the trust extended.
73
  Strategies for transferring the family fortune in-
to trust with little or no transfer tax liability constitute an important 
prelude to the exercise of fiduciary investment discretion in ways that 
the family wants, because any tax paid is likely to reduce the funds 
that ultimately find their way into trust.
74
  Also important for minimiz-
ing the overall tax burden on a family fortune is placing funds in a 
trust of extended duration.  In this Part, we consider the advantages 
of establishing a long-term trust and examine one particularly power-
ful strategy for transferring funds to it with little to no transfer tax 
liability—the Note-Sale.  If the Note-Sale is not adequate to shelter 
the family fortune, other strategies can be brought to bear on what 
remains—among the more popular being the “zeroed out GRAT.”  
These various techniques make possible the transfer of what is effec-
tively tens of millions of dollars into perpetual trust without the fami-
ly ever having to pay transfer tax.
75
 
 
 71 Aucutt, supra note 41, at 3–4. 
 72 See Kozusko, supra note 64, at 17–19. 
 73 See Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 59, at 650. 
 74 See, e.g., Harrington & Harding, supra note 5, at 697–99 (discussing potential 
tax issues for private trust companies).   
 75 As this Article goes to press, the Estate Tax has been repealed effective January 
1, 2010, pursuant to the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001.  Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501, 115 Stat. 69.  To minimize the projected drain on 
the federal fisc from the repeal of the tax as projected at the time of the 2001 legisla-
tion, the law included a provision whereby the Estate Tax is to resurrect on January 1, 
2011, id. § 901, with a Unified Credit substantially reduced from the amount in effect 
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A. The Long-Term Trust 
To take a step back, the need to invest subject to a fiduciary 
standard would not arise but for the family fortune being in trust.  If 
the members of the family held family assets outright, then each gen-
eration of the family as it came into its inheritance would be free to 
invest—and indeed to risk—the funds as it saw fit.  Thus, the question 
is why a very wealthy family eager to minimize its transfer tax burden 
would transfer its property into trust? 
The simple transfer-tax reason
76
 that wealthy families put their 
fortunes into trust is that only the initial transfer into trust—the 
transfer in fee simple from the donor to the trustee—is subject to 
transfer tax.
77
  And this is the case even though multiple, successive 
generations of the family subsequently benefit from the property as 
equitable owners.  In contrast, if the family fortune were transferred 
outright from parent to child and then from child to grandchild and 
so on, each of the transfers (all in fee simple) would trigger a tax.
78
  
Taken together, the multiple instances of taxation as property des-
cended from one family member to another, generation to genera-
tion, would make for a great drain on the family fortune.  But if the 
property is transferred into trust, it is not subject to transfer tax again 
 
in 2009 immediately before the repeal of the tax (sufficient to shelter $3,500,000) to 
the amount in play in 2001,when the legislation was first enacted (sufficient to shel-
ter $1,000,000).  Compare I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006), with I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2000).  Many 
expect that Congress will act in late 2010 and  reinstitute the Estate Tax retroactive to 
January 1, 2010.  Martin Vaughan, Estate-Tax Repeal Means Some Spouses Are Left Out, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2010, at B1.  Others believe that Congress will simply wait and al-
low the tax to resurrect in 2011, as per the 2001 legislation.  Id.  With two wars un-
derway and the federal deficit at historic levels, however, no one expects that the re-
peal of the tax will be made permanent.  Accordingly, this Article proceeds under 
the assumption that, going forward, the Estate Tax will endure in much the same 
form it has had in the past.  Finally, note that the Gift Tax was not repealed by the 
2001 legislation as the Gift Tax plays (among other things) a critical role in back-
stopping the income tax.  The Unified Credit currently applicable to the Gift Tax is 
sufficient to shelter $1,000,000 in lifetime gifts.  I.R.C. § 2505(a) (2006). 
 76 Placing assets in trust can also protect them from beneficiaries’ creditors as, 
generally, creditors of a trust beneficiary can only “stand in the beneficiary’s shoes” 
and claim the income or principal that the beneficiary is legally entitled to receive at 
the time he or she is entitled to receive it.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501, 7C U.L.A. 520 
(2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 60 (2003); Charles D. 
Fox & Michael J. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
287, 294 (2002) (noting that “[i]n most states, a beneficiary’s creditors cannot reach 
trust assets if the trustee’s power to distribute trust assets is subject to the trustee’s 
discretion”). 
 77 See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD ET AL., TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 60–61 
(23d ed. 2006).   
 78 I.R.C. §§ 2501(a), 2511 (2006) (gift tax); id. § 2001(a) (estate tax). 
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until the trust terminates and the property goes outright to the bene-
ficiaries (termed “remaindermen”).  Only after the trust terminates, 
when those remaindermen—now holding the property outright and 
free of trust—transfer the property, will the property again be subject 
to transfer tax.
79
  And most significantly, if the property can stay in 
trust in perpetuity, the property is beyond the transfer tax regime 
forever. 
So not only is the overall transfer tax burden on multiple gener-
ations lessened substantially if the property is placed in trust, but the 
longer the trust lasts and the more generations of a family that can 
benefit from the property while it is in trust, the greater the overall 
tax savings.  In short, the longer the term of the trust, the more “tax-
efficient” the trust is. 
Until the late 1980s, efforts to extend the time horizon for a 
trust into the distant future were thwarted by the common law Rule 
Against Perpetuities.
80
  A movement to repeal the Rule
81
 has been fair-
 
 79 Many provisions under the federal transfer tax regime make it advantageous 
for the trustee to be an independent party, placing the exercise of certain aspects of 
fiduciary discretion outside the family and not in the hands of the donor of any trust 
or any beneficiary.  For example, neither the donor of a given trust nor the trust be-
neficiaries should control discretionary distributions of income or principal.  If the 
donor retains control of distributions from the trust, this power can potentially cause 
inclusion of the property subject to the discretion in the donor’s estate.  See I.R.C. 
§§ 2036, 2038.  If a beneficiary can make distributions to herself or to someone for 
whom she has a support obligation, this control will under certain circumstances be 
deemed a general power of appointment and cause inclusion of the property subject 
to the power in her estate.  See id. § 2041.  Further, if a family member controls dis-
tributions from a trust where she is not a beneficiary, but where other family mem-
bers are beneficiaries, her control can also trigger application of the “reciprocal trust 
doctrine,” especially if she is a beneficiary of a second trust, one where those other 
family members are trustees.  See United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 321–
24 (1969).  The consequence of running afoul of these rules is to make property 
once transferred into trust and (supposedly) beyond the reach of the transfer tax re-
gime again subject to tax.  Where the exercise of fiduciary powers through a family 
trust company is concerned, however, the Internal Revenue Service has recently be-
gun to lay this matter to rest, providing guidance with respect to decision-making 
structures within a family trust company that will conform to the requirements of the 
transfer tax regime with respect to discretionary distributions of trust income and 
principal.  IRS Notice 2008-63, 2008-2 C.B. 261. 
 80 Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: 
R.I.P for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2100 (2003). 
 81 Elements of the estate planning bar and certain banking interests spearheaded 
this movement.  See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competi-
tion for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 
373–74 (2005) (describing the race between states to abolish the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities); see also Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 595, 596 (2005) (discussing the abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities in the 
context of perpetual dynasty trusts). 
GOODWIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2010  7:16 PM 
486 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:467 
ly successful, however, and to date, nearly one-half of the states and 
the District of Columbia have eliminated the Rule altogether (or ef-
fectively done so).
82
  A trust can now be of virtually infinite duration 
provided that it is established in a “non-perpetuities” jurisdiction.  
Leaving aside strategies for funding a perpetual trust, the mere fact 
that trusts can last in perpetuity constitutes an enormous advantage 
for wealthy families because once wealth is in a perpetual trust, it sits 
beyond the reach of the transfer tax regime forever.
83
 
The fact that to date the Rule Against Perpetuities remains intact 
in many states is no impediment to a wealthy family still living in a 
perpetuities jurisdiction.  Wherever family members live, the family 
simply needs to name a trustee in a non-perpetuities jurisdiction who 
can administer the trust in that state.
84
  The need for a “nexus” with a 
non-perpetuities jurisdiction does, however, mean that, for a family 
planning to place a family trust company at the helm as trustee of a 
perpetual trust, the family needs to establish its trust company in a 
state that not only permits a modern family trust company but also 
has eliminated the Rule Against Perpetuities.  Fortunately, for the 
 
 82 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.100 (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. & 2009 
Spec. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2901(A)(2) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 49th Le-
gis. 4th Spec. Sess. & ch. 1 of 5th Spec. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-1102.5(1) 
(LEXIS through 2009 Legis. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (2007); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 55-111 (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 305/1–
6 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through Public Act 96-884 of 2009 Legis. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 33, § 101-A (Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & 
TRUSTS § 11-102 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.025 
(West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2005(9) (Lex-
isNexis, LEXIS through 2009 1st Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564:24 (Westlaw 
through ch. 1 of 2010 Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2F-9 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2131.09 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 128th Gen. Assem.); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 6107.1 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (LEXIS through ch. 365 of Jan. 
2009 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. Ct. 
R. 09-09); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3 (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 2009 Spec. 
Sess. I); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.130 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. effec-
tive through Mar. 16, 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West, Westlaw through2009 
Act 78, Acts 80–93, and Acts 95–100); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-139(b)(i) (LEXIS 
through 2009 Gen. Assem.).  The District of Columbia has also eliminated the Rule 
against Perpetuities.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-904 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through D.C. Act 
18-254).  In addition, several states significantly extend the rule as it applies to trusts.  
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.225 (West 2008) (360 years); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §  111.1031 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through Apr. 2009) (365 years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1203 
(LEXIS through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.) (1,000 years). 
 83 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & 
GIFTS 120.1, at 120.1–120.2 (2d ed. 1993); JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & 
MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 822–23 (2d ed. 2003) (1998). 
 84 Of course, the family could also employ an individual trustee resident in the 
jurisdiction or big bank trustee authorized to conduct trust business in the jurisdic-
tion with the caveats stated supra Part II.C.1. 
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family wanting to establish its own trust company and name that enti-
ty trustee of a perpetual trust, many of the states that have liberalized 
their laws with respect to forming privately owned, family trust com-
panies have also changed their laws to eliminate the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.
85
 
B. Funding the Trust 
The potential tax when the property is initially transferred into 
trust remains at issue, however, and for a family of great wealth, this 
amount can be considerable.  Once a perpetual trust has been estab-
lished, the scene then shifts to strategies to transfer property into it 
with little to no transfer tax liability.  This is accomplished by exploit-
ing the various credits and exemptions from transfer tax under the 
Internal Revenue Code (included there so that taxpayers of modest 
means can transfer assets without incurring liability).  For the very 
wealthy, however, the trick is not to use these credits and exemptions 
“dollar-for-dollar” (i.e., a dollar of credit or exemption applied to 
shelter a dollar of family wealth).  Instead, sophisticated planning 
techniques (like the Note-Sale) subject assets to discounting tech-
niques and then in various ways “leverage” the credits and exemp-
tions, so that the dollar limitations as per the Internal Revenue Code 
become more apparent than real. 
1. The Unified Credit and the GST Exemption 
Like all non-charitable gratuitous transfers, transfers into trust 
are subject to Estate Tax (if made at death) or to Gift Tax (if made 
during life).
86
  Shelter from the Estate and Gift Tax is available, how-
ever, in the form of the Unified Credit.
87
  If the trust benefits grand-
children and more remote descendants, then in addition to Estate or 
Gift Tax, transfers to the trust will be subject to the Generation-
Skipping Transfer (GST) Tax.
88
  Generation-skipping transfers, how-
ever, can also be sheltered -- with the GST Exemption.
89
 
With respect to the Unified Credit, every transferor currently has 
a lifetime credit sufficient to shelter up to $3.5 million in transfers 
 
 85 See supra Part II.A; sources cited supra note 82.  Trusts for which the family trust 
company is successor trustee are another question.  The desired jurisdiction can be 
challenged if the initial trustee is domiciled in an undesirable jurisdiction.  
 86 I.R.C. § 2001 (2006) (estate tax); id. §§ 2501(a), 2511 (gift tax). 
 87 Id. § 2010 (estate tax); id. § 2505 (gift tax). 
 88 See id. § 2601. 
 89 Id. § 2631. 
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made during life or at death.
90
  At present, however, only $1 million 
of the credit is available for use during life, and, accordingly, this 
amount becomes the operative figure for many planning strategies.
91
  
This is because, even though the Unified Credit can be applied to 
transfers made at death, most of the more sophisticated tax planning 
strategies make use of transfers not at death but during life—gifts es-
sentially.
92
  There are reasons for this, the most important of which is 
that gifts can be timed, effectively giving the taxpayer significant con-
trol over the gift’s value.  This control over the timing of the trans-
fer—and thereby the value of the gift for transfer tax purposes—is a 
large element of not only the Note-Sale, but of other strategies as 
well.
93
 
But there is an additional transfer tax applicable to transfers 
made to a long-term or perpetual trust—the GST Tax.
94
  The Estate 
and Gift Tax is designed to tax wealth every generation.  Neverthe-
less, as noted above, trusts benefiting successive generations can neat-
ly avoid successive impositions of estate and gift tax as the property in 
trust becomes available to grandchildren and more remote descen-
dants.
95
  This means that, if the Estate and Gift Tax was the sole trans-
fer tax, the initial transfer into trust would be subject to tax but, after 
that, multiple generations would enjoy the property without further 
imposition of tax.  In 1986
96
 in an effort to close this loophole, Con-
gress layered on to those transfers the GST Tax and subjected gener-
ation-skipping transfers (whether made outright or in trust) to this 
additional tax.
97
  Thus, like all non-charitable gratuitous transfers, 
generation-skipping transfers are subject either to the Gift Tax (if 
 
 90 Id. § 2010(c). 
 91 Id. § 2505(a). 
 92 Even though the Estate Tax and Gift Tax generally work together to make for a 
unified regime, gifts are still more “tax efficient” than transfers at death.  See 
CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 77, at 12, 70–71. 
 93 A second reason that gifts are more “tax efficient” than transfers at death is 
that gifts are tax exclusive while transfers at death are tax inclusive; the funds used to 
pay the gift tax are not themselves subject to tax, while funds used to pay estate tax 
form part of the base against which the rate of taxation is applied.  See id. at 12.  This 
second reason is less relevant here in that no transfer tax will be paid. 
 94 See generally I.R.C. §§ 2601–2663. 
 95 See CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 77, at 726–28. 
 96 A federal tax on generation-skipping transfers was first enacted in 1976.  This 
tax was considered conceptually flawed; Congress therefore substantially repealed it 
and enacted a new tax in 1986.  See CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 77, at 727 (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 824 (1985)). 
 97 Id. 
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they occur during life) or to the Estate Tax (if they occur at death).
98
  
But where the transfer potentially benefits grandchildren or more 
remote descendants, the transfer is subject to the GST Tax in addi-
tion to the Estate or Gift Tax.
99
  Taken together, the Estate or Gift 
Tax and the GST Tax make for a virtually confiscatory imposition of 
tax.
100
 
For those seeking to circumvent the transfer tax regime with 
long-term trusts, such is the bad news.  There is also good news, how-
ever, in the form of a lifetime exemption from the GST Tax, current-
ly in the amount of $3.5 million, the entire amount of which can be 
used to shelter transfers made during life or at death.
101
  While (un-
like the Unified Credit) the entire GST Exemption of $3.5 million 
can be used for transfers during life if the taxpayer so chooses, the 
transfer will also be subject to the Gift Tax; there the Unified Credit 
will shelter only $1 million of the transfer.
102
  Consequently, even 
though a transfer in excess of $1 million could be sheltered from the 
GST Tax, the excess would be subject to the Gift Tax.
103
  Therefore, 
the $1 million amount sheltered by the Unified Credit operates for 
most wealthy donors as a cap here as well, as families tend to be dis-
inclined to incur tax for lifetime transfers.
104
 
2. The Note-Sale 
Transfers to a perpetual trust will then be subject both to the 
Gift Tax and to the GST Tax and must be sheltered from both unless 
a tax is to be paid.  The Note-Sale is a strategy for sheltering the fund-
ing of a perpetual trust and constitutes a two-stroke finesse of the 
 
 98 Id. at 729. 
 99 See id. at 729–730. The GST Tax is applicable to a transfer made to or for the 
benefit of a “skip person,” meaning any person of a generation that is two or more 
generations below the transferor (such as a grandchild).  See I.R.C. § 2613(a)(1) 
(2006).  “Direct skips” to such persons are taxable and would include gifts outright 
and gifts in trusts that benefit solely skip persons.  See id. § 2612(c)(1).  Where trusts 
benefit both skip and non-skip (i.e., children) persons, then “taxable distributions” 
of income and principal from such trusts, as well as “taxable terminations” from such 
trusts (where property goes outright to one or more skip persons), are subject to tax.  
Id. § 2612(b). 
 100 See CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 77, at 735–36.  
 101 See I.R.C. § 2010(c). 
 102 See id. § 2631(a). 
 103 See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text. 
 104 Because the Gift Tax will have to be paid if the taxpayer makes lifetime trans-
fers in excess of $1 million, transfers to a perpetual trust are unlikely to be made in 
excess of $1 million.    
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meager $1 million of Unified Credit applicable to gifts and the GST 
Exemption that it effectively caps. 
a. Step One: The Valuation Envelope 
If the GST Exemption and Gift Tax Credit are applied dollar-for-
dollar, $1 million of the GST Exemption and the current Gift Tax 
Credit will shelter only $1 million of assets.  There are, however, 
more tax-efficient ways to make gifts and to use the GST Exemption 
and the Gift Tax Credit.  Family assets are made eligible for valuation 
discounting by first swallowing them in a family limited partnership, a 
close corporation, or a limited liability company before they are 
transferred into trust.
105
  This entity is then capitalized into voting and 
non-voting shares and, for the time being, the head of the family re-
tains both.
106
 
At this point the stage is set to make more effective use of the 
GST Exemption and Gift Tax Credit.  The non-voting shares are now 
eligible for a valuation discount for both lack of marketability be-
cause they represent an interest in a closely held entity
107
 and lack of 
control because they have no voting rights.
108
  Conservative planners 
 
 105 See Richard A. Oshins & Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the 
Next Millennium, TR. & EST., Oct. 1998, at 68, 82–88 (discussing benefits of an install-
ment sale to a grantor trust).  Assets that might be transferred into this closely held 
envelope include a family business (an operating company that may itself be closely 
held), publicly traded securities, real estate, private equity, etc.  See id. at 70–72.  
Once the closely held envelope is created and assets have been transferred to it, the 
head of the family takes back the voting and non-voting shares.  See id. at 76. 
 106 See id. at 76–77. 
 107 See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 240.  Discounts as high as thirty-five per-
cent are commonly applied in valuing interests in closely held businesses—that is to 
say, in valuing interests for which there is little to no market because they are not 
publicly traded.  Valuing closely held interests begins by reference to comparable as-
sets that are publicly traded.  See id. at 239.  Then, assuming there is no ready market 
for the particular interests in question, a discount is applied under the assumption 
that a buyer would not pay as much for such interests.  If any stock is also subject to 
restrictions on sale, the marketability discount can be substantially greater.  See Estate 
of McClatchy v. Comm’r, 147 F.3d 1089, 1094, (9th Cir. 1998).  Note, however, that 
the Internal Revenue Service can resist or seek to reduce a marketability discount 
where a closely held entity is holding assets that are readily marketable.  See McCord 
v. Comm’r, 120 T.C. 358, 395 (2003).  McCord concerned two limited partnerships 
where one-third of one partnership and two-thirds of a second partnership consisted 
in marketable securities or interests in real estate holding partnerships.  Id. at 367–
68.  The taxpayer claimed a thirty-five percent discount for lack of marketability, but 
the Tax Court reduced the discount to twenty percent.  Id. at 389, 395.  Even in this 
instance, however, some discount was deemed justified given the partnership 
envelope.  See id. at 395. 
 108 See, e.g., Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).  The 
ability to obtain a discount for lack of control even where all the interests in the 
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would generally apply a forty percent discount under these circums-
tances.
109
  As such, assets that would be worth $1 million, if held free 
of the closely held entity, can now be valued at $600,000.  According-
ly, $1 million of the GST Tax Exemption and the Gift Tax Credit can 
now be used to shelter assets that would have a value of approximate-
ly $1.667 million were they held free of the closely held entity.  Note 
also that these amounts will double in the case of a married couple 
planning together. 
The head of the family then transfers $1 million in cash or equi-
valents to the perpetual trust.
110
  Under the Note-Sale strategy, this 
transfer (the “seeding” of the trust) is the only transfer that is actually 
a “gift” for Gift Tax purposes, and it is here that the Gift Tax Credit 
and $1 million of the GST Exemption are applied. 
b. Step Two: Purchase of Discounted Assets 
The placement of a family’s wealth into a closely held entity and 
the establishment of a perpetual trust are preliminary steps.  While 
some advantage would be gained if the non-voting (now discounted) 
shares were simply contributed to the perpetual trust (instead of 
“seeding” the trust with $1 million in cash), this would not realize the 
full potential of the Exemption or the Credit.  So, instead, at this 
juncture the trustee of the trust (here the Family Trust Company) 
steps forward and purchases $10 million of the non-voting shares 
from the head of the family and gives back an installment note
111
 in 
 
closely held entity are owned within a family (or by trusts for their benefit) is the leg-
acy of Bright.  The case vindicated a long established precedent that attribution 
should not apply to lump together family members’ stock for valuation purposes un-
der the transfer tax regime.  See id. at 1002; Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202 (where 
the Service acquiesced in Bright). 
 109 In the past, courts have granted a single discount percentage, such as forty 
percent, without segregating the discount attributable to minority status from that 
attributable to lack of marketability.  It is important to recognize the distinction be-
tween the discount for lack of control and that for lack of marketability, however, be-
cause in recent years the courts have tended (quite properly) to analyze these dis-
counts separately in arriving at a discount appropriate in a given situation.  See, e.g., 
Estate of McClatchy, 147 F.3d 1089.   
 110 Either cash or discounted assets can be used here, although the real advantage 
of the discounted assets materializes in Step Two.  See Oshins & Oshins, supra note 
105, at 68, 93.   
 111 The terms of the loan are governed by many considerations under the transfer 
tax regime.  First, the loan will be an intrafamily loan and so, to avoid gift-loan treat-
ment under I.R.C. § 7872, it must bear an interest rate of at least the Applicable Fed-
eral Rate.  See I.R.C. § 7872(a), (e) (2006).  This is a market rate of interest deter-
mined by reference to the average yield on U.S. government obligations.  See id. 
§§ 1274(d)(1)(C), 7872(f)(2).  As it works out, however, the rate is generally more 
than fair to the borrower when compared to rates that are likely to be commercially 
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the amount of $9 million, along with the $1 million (just received 
when the trust was seeded) as a down payment.  Per the note, the 
trustee is required to pay only interest during the term, with principal 
due in nine years—at the end of the term—in the form of a balloon 
payment, with a right of prepayment.
112
 
Courtesy of the trustee’s purchase of the assets in exchange for 
the note, the fair market value of the assets that ultimately fund the 
trust is $10 million instead of the $1 million contributed gratuitously.  
Further, because the assets were initially placed in a closely held enti-
ty, the $10 million of assets that ultimately fund the trust would be 
worth approximately $16.67 million if held free of this entity—or $20 
million and approximately $33.3 million, respectively, in the case of a 
married couple.
113
 
The $10 million amount of the note is only ten times the $1 mil-
lion gift, a margin that is not so great that it vitiates the claim that the 
entire transaction has a business purpose.
114
  And so long as the trans-
action has a business purpose, the transaction occurs outside the 
scope of the transfer tax regime.  Under the Gift Tax Regulations, the 
transfer is not a gift if it is “a sale, exchange, or other transfer of 
property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction 
 
available.  The nine-year term will make it a long-term loan under § 7872, therefore 
making it eligible for the long-term interest rate (usually a lower rate than the short-
er term rates).  The Applicable Federal Rates are redetermined each month.  See id. 
§ 1274(d)(1)(B).  For term loans of more than three years, the market interest rates 
for longer term obligations are used, depending on the term of the loan.  See id. 
§ 1274(d)(1)(C).  In the case of a term loan, the Applicable Federal Rate for the en-
tire period of the loan is determined by the rate for the month in which the loan is 
made.  See id. § 7872(f)(2)(A).  In the case of a demand loan, which has no applica-
tion in the Note-Sale, the rate varies from month to month as the Federal rates are 
re-determined.  See id. § 7872(f)(2)(B).  
 112   The loan will be an intrafamily loan, so to avoid gift-loan treatment the inter-
est rate will be determined by the Applicable Federal Rate.  See id. § 7872(a),(e).  The 
nine-year term will make it a long-term loan.  Oshins & Oshins, supra note 105, at 84. 
 113 Oshins & Oshins, supra note 105, at 82. 
 114 The business purpose of the closely held entity also lends support to the busi-
ness purpose of the entire transaction.  The closely held entity needs a genuine busi-
ness purpose beyond its role in a tax-minimization strategy.  Such a purpose could 
be, for example, the need to bring managerial integration to a diverse and complex 
portfolio of assets.  Absence of some bona fide business purpose will invite numerous 
objections from the Internal Revenue Service and the courts such that the closely 
held entity is likely to be viewed as a mere tax avoidance artifice.  This is especially 
the case where this “wrapper” holds largely passive investment assets (such as mar-
ketable securities) that could just as well be held outright.  See Oshins & Oshins, supra 
note 105, at 82.  In addition, care must be taken that the closely held entity is used in 
a way consistent with a business purpose.  See infra notes 115–16.  For example, all 
assets should not be transferred into the closely held entity necessitating the payment 
of household obligations out of the closely held entity.  
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which is bona fide, arm’s-length, and free of any donative intent).”
115
 
Other elements of the transaction also lend support to the claim that 
the Note has a business purpose, including the timing of the pur-
chase of the shares relative to the funding of the trust where at least a 
six-month lag is recommended.
116
 
 
 115 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).  To escape Gift Tax treat-
ment, it is also important here to establish that the transfer was for “adequate and 
full consideration in money or money’s worth.”  Id.  The element of consideration 
not only removes the transfer from the realm of the gift tax, but also ensures that the 
value of the trust will not be included in the donor’s estate if she were to die during 
the term of the Note.  See I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038(a) (2006).  Attention to the valuation 
of assets transferred into trust is then important.  The plan here is to have the note 
repaid before the donor dies—thus the prepayment provision of the Note.  In the 
event, however, that the donor dies during the term of the Note, the Note itself will 
be in the donor’s estate, but it may be eligible for discounting because of its long-
term and low interest rate.  Oshins & Oshins, supra note 105, at 84.  Furthermore and 
most importantly, however, if the Note winds up in the donor’s estate, the appre-
ciated assets of the trust do not.   
 116 Recently, the Internal Revenue Service has attacked the use of closely held ent-
ities as discounting devices by relying on I.R.C. § 2036(a).  Several decades of case 
law (in which the Internal Revenue Service has acquiesced) preclude the Service 
from attacking the discount by aggregating the interests of family members and 
trusts for their benefit in determining whether the value of closely held interests 
should be discounted for lack of control.  See, e.g., Estate of Bright v. United States, 
658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (Internal Revenue Service acquiesces in Rev. Rul. 93-12, 
1993-1 C.B. 202).  In two cases with similar facts, the Internal Revenue Service has 
more successfully applied § 2036(a), however, as it includes in the decedent’s gross 
estate any asset as to which the decedent has retained a right to the income from the 
property.  See Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 2005); Estate of Thomp-
son v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2004).  In these two cases, the Internal 
Revenue Service also successively applied § 2036(a) to include the underlying assets 
held in any entity in a decedent transferor’s estate where the partnership was formed 
only shortly before the decedent’s death, lending an aura of the testamentary substi-
tute to the transaction, and the decedent transferred nearly all his net worth to the 
closely held entity, necessitating that he rely on income from the entity for his sup-
port until his death—the last being critical to the application of § 2036(a).  See Stran-
gi, 417 F.3d at 472; Thompson, 382 F.3d at 369.  Finally, the entity was funded almost 
entirely with marketable securities.  See Strangi, 417 F.3d at 478; Thompson, 382 F.3d at 
370.   In Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004), however, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached a contrary result.  While, as in 
Thompson and Strangi, the decedent had transferred property to a family limited 
partnership not long before his death, in Kimbell there were good business reasons 
for placing the assets (which included oil and gas working interests) in a partnership.  
Id. at 267.  Further, the transferor retained sufficient property to provide for his own 
support.  Id. at 259.  Care must be taken to see that the closely held entity is created 
well in advance of the death of the transferor, that there is a business purpose (other 
than tax avoidance) for creation of the entity, that all the formalities of maintaining 
and operating the closely held entity are observed, that assets transferred to the enti-
ty are operating assets requiring management (rather than passive investment assets, 
such as marketable securities), and that the decedent has retained sufficient wealth 
to support herself without receiving income from the entity.  See generally Oshins & 
Oshins, supra note 105. 
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The Note-Sale also exploits certain aspects of the income tax re-
gime.  The trust will be drafted so that, during the life of the donor, it 
will be a “grantor trust” for income tax purposes.  This “grantor trust 
status” is created by turning to the parts of the Internal Revenue 
Code that govern the income tax regime and including a provision in 
the trust that intentionally violates one or more of the grantor trust 
rules under the Internal Revenue Code—for example, by giving the 
donor the right to exchange property in the trust for property of 
equivalent value.
117
  Whatever power is included here, it is unlikely 
that the donor will exercise it.  This does not matter.  The mere pres-
ence of the power in the trust agreement will ensure that the donor is 
considered the “owner” of trust assets for income tax purposes and, 
most importantly, transactions between the trust and the donor (the 
Note-Sale, for example) will be ignored for income tax purposes.
118
  
Thus, while the sale of the non-voting shares to the trustee would 
otherwise be a realization event for income tax purpose, no gain will 
have to be recognized.  For income tax purposes, it is as if the trust 
does not exist and the transaction did not happen.
119
 
3. Other Strategies 
Effective as the Note-Sale might be for transferring tens of mil-
lions of dollars with the application of only the $1 million Gift Tax 
Credit and $1 million of the GST Exemption, many families still find 
themselves with considerable wealth remaining in the hands of the 
donor generation.  Other strategies are available to transfer addition-
al wealth with little to no transfer tax, however, and this is the case 
even if the donor generation has completely exhausted its $1 million 
($2 million in the case of a couple) Gift Tax Unified Credit.  Indeed, 
especially popular in such circumstances is the Grantor Retained An-
nuity Trust (GRAT) and in particular its most aggressive application, 
the “zeroed out” GRAT.
120
 
 
 117 See I.R.C. §§ 673–679 (2006).  This planning opportunity is possible because 
the grantor trust rules (which are primarily creatures of the income tax regime) “do 
not work in pari materia” with the gift tax regime.  See Oshins & Oshins, supra note 
105, at 73.  Care must be taken, however, to make certain that this retained power 
offends only with respect to the income tax regime but does not vitiate the transfer 
for purpose of the transfer tax regime.  For purposes of the Estate and Gift Tax or 
indeed the GST, it is essential that the transfer be complete.    
 118 See Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184. 
 119 See Oshins & Oshins, supra note 105, at 73; Randall D. Roth, The Intentional Use 
of Tax-Defective Trusts, in 26 INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 400, 403.3–404.1 (John T. 
Gaubatz ed., 1992) . 
 120 See CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 77, at 245–46 (citing Walton v. Comm’r, 115 
T.C. 589 (2000)). 
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The GRAT is a creature of reforms enacted in 1990 that resulted 
in the addition of Chapter 14 of the Estate and Gift Tax with its spe-
cial valuation rules.
121
  These strict valuation rules are applicable to 
certain transfers in trust, especially those where the donor generation 
retains a present interest structured as an annuity
122
 while transferring 
a remainder interest to the donee generation, thereby making a gift 
to them. 
Consistent with the Chapter 14 valuation rules, if the donor gen-
eration retains a large enough income interest, the actuarial value of 
the remainder—the gift to the donee generation—will be zero or 
very close to it, making for a “zeroed-out” GRAT.
123
  Where the value 
of the remainder is zero or nearly so, there will be little to no gift tax 
due on the transfer—a welcome outcome where the donor genera-
tion has already exhausted its gift tax Unified Credit.  The value of 
the remainder interest will be zero where the donor generation re-
tains a very large income interest. To satisfy this income interest will 
require (pursuant to the required valuation methodology) not only 
the income produced by the trust assets, but also a return of princip-
al.  At the end of the annuity term, nothing will be left to be distri-
buted to the donee generation, at least per the Chapter 14 valuation 
 
 121 These valuation rules were meant to eliminate certain capitalization strategies 
by which closely held companies were capitalized so that the donor generation could 
retain a preferred interest in a family business while the younger generation received 
common stock.  See id. at 230–36.  These interests were subjected to various favorable 
valuation techniques so that the interest passing to the donee generation was often 
valued at a fraction of its worth at the time of the transfer.  See id. at 230–31. 
 122  Of course, the value of the gift also reflects the retained annuity.  This income 
interest must consist in annual payments of either (1) a fixed dollar amount or (2) 
an amount equal to a fixed percentage of the trust value, determined annually. See 
I.R.C. § 2702(b)(1)–(2) (2006).  Where an income interest does not conform to 
these requirements, the income interest will be valued at zero, potentially making for 
an expensive gift to the donee generation of 100 percent of the value of the property 
transferred into trust.  See id. § 2702(a)(2)(A).  
 123 The “zeroed out” GRAT was for some time deemed controversial as the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and the estate planning bar argued about the meaning and in-
terpretation of Example 5 under Treas. Reg. 25.2702-3(e) (2007).  The IRS had ar-
gued that the retained interest should be valued as an annuity payable for the shorter 
of the term of the retained annuity or the grantor’s death.  See, e.g., Walton, 115 T.C. 
at 594.  This analysis would reduce the value of the retained interest and therefore 
increase the value of the remainder (the gift).   The Tax Court, examining the legis-
lative history of § 2702, ultimately concluded that Example 5 in Treas. Reg. 25.2702-
3(e), is an “unreasonable interpretation and invalid extension” of § 2702.  Walton, 
115 T.C. at 604.  The Commissioner has since acquiesced in the Tax Court holding 
and has issued regulations affirming the result in the case.  See Rev. Rul. 2003-72, 
2003-2 C.B. 964; Treas. Reg. 25.2702-3(e), exs. 5, 6, & 8 (2009) (amended in 2005). 
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rules.
124
  Of course, these calculations are predicated on the value of 
the property on the date it is transferred into trust together with the 
imputed rate of appreciation.
125
  The donor is betting, however, that 
the reality will be very different—a point to which we will return mo-
mentarily. 
But there are drawbacks to the GRAT.  Probably its biggest dis-
advantage is that it does not readily lend itself to a perpetual trust.  
The donor’s GST Exemption cannot be applied to shelter the prop-
erty transferred to the GRAT until the expiration of the donor’s 
present interest.
126
  By that point, if all has gone according to plan, 
the assets will have appreciated far in excess of their initial worth.  In 
short, this means that the GST Exemption cannot be leveraged here, 
but must be applied dollar-for-dollar.  For this reason, GRAT remain-
dermen are always children rather than more remote generations, so 
as to avoid generation-skipping liability.
127
  Absent application of the 
GST Exemption, transfers to subsequent generations will be subject 
to transfer tax. 
Other “high-tech” strategies also remain—large designs that 
again allow a wealthy family to minimize its transfer tax liability, even 
where the Unified Credit and Generation-Skipping Tax Exemption 
have been exhausted.  For example, the charitable lead trust is a split-
interest trust that can allow a family to transfer significant wealth to 
children and more remote generations with little to no transfer tax 
liability.
128
  As with the GRAT, the donor can effectively “zero out” the 
charitable lead trust by setting the payments to charity high enough 
that the present value of the lead interest to charity will be equal to or 
almost equal to the full value of the assets contributed to the trust.  If 
 
 124 Cf. CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 77, at 245–46 (providing an example). 
 125 See id. at 241–43. 
 126 § 2642(f)(1), (3). 
 127 There are other drawbacks to the GRAT.  First, in utilizing the Note-Sale strat-
egy, it is advantageous if the grantor of the perpetual trust (and holder of the Note) 
survives the term of the Note so that the Note does not wind up an asset of his estate.  
See Oshins & Oshins, supra note 105, at 84.  But it does not entirely scuttle  the plan if 
in fact the grantor dies before this happens.  See id.   In the case of a GRAT, the gran-
tor of the trust must survive the term of the retained annuity or all the property in 
the trust will be restored to his estate for estate tax purposes under I.R.C. § 2036(a).  
See id.  Second, with respect to the Note-Sale, the rate of return that must be applied 
to the Note is almost always going to be lower than the rate used to value the GRAT 
remainder because of the difference in requirements of the valuation regimen appli-
cable in each case.  See id.  The consequence is that the rate of appreciation that must 
be achieved for the Note-Sale to be successful is likely to be lower than the rate for 
the GRAT.  See id.   
 128 § 2522(c)(4)(B); T.D. 8923, 2001-1 C.B. 485. 
GOODWIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2010  7:16 PM 
2010] HOW THE RICH STAY RICH 497 
the donor zeros out the trust, the value of the gift to the donee gen-
eration will be zero or close to it, and again, no transfer tax will be 
owed. 
4. Beating the Imputed Rate of Appreciation 
If any of these strategies are to “work,” however, the assets must, 
at a minimum, appreciate at a rate higher than the interest rate on 
the loan (in the case of the Note-Sale) or than the imputed rate of 
growth under Chapter 14 (in the case of the GRAT or the charitable 
lead trust).  In the case of the Note-Sale, this is highly likely to hap-
pen.  The discounting of the assets by virtue of the closely held 
“wrapper” ultimately ensures that the assets making their way into the 
trust are more valuable than the amount the trustee has paid for 
them. 
Nevertheless, valuation discounts and leveraging notwithstand-
ing, each of these strategies realizes its greatest potential when the 
underlying assets—those transferred to the closely held entity—hold 
significant appreciation potential.  The prospects for transferring 
wealth between generations without having to pay transfer tax in-
crease exponentially if the property placed into the closely held entity 
is a business being formed, a new product being developed, a new lo-
cation for an existing business, an investment opportunity, or a close-
ly held business soon to go public.  Ideally, the assets transferred into 
the “envelope” are significant interests in a venture that can reasona-
bly be predicted to explode in value.  It is here that roughly $33 mil-
lion (itself transferred without paying transfer tax) can easily become 
$100 million.
129
 
Of course, if these assets are going to be transferred into trust, 
even as non-voting shares of a closely held wrapper, the family re-
quires a trustee that is willing to hold such an investment.  At this 
point, the stage is set to consider the legal discretion a trustee might 
have to do just that. 
IV. PUTTING THE PEDAL TO THE METAL: FIDUCIARY  
INVESTMENT DISCRETION 
If addressing the dissipation of assets  held in trust is indeed the 
last frontier in the preservation of great fortunes, it is no longer 
plausible to chalk this problem up simply to the drain of transfer tax.   
 
 129 The timing of the transfer, however, has to be carefully calculated, such as in 
the instance of an initial public offering where the stock is to be valued before the 
public offering.  If this value is to be sustained, the more time between the transfer 
into trust and the public offering, the better.  
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Indeed, wealthy families whose property has long been in trust, where 
it was safe from the dissipating pressure of the fisc, have for decades 
appreciated the pernicious effects of a conservative fiduciary invest-
ment philosophy (supported by a conservative law governing fidu-
ciary investment discretion).
130
  For the more recently wealthy, con-
cern with fiduciary investing has come front and center.  These 
families rely on tax-minimizing strategies (such as the Note-Sale) that 
not only transfer assets into trust with little to no transfer tax liability, 
but also make integral to the plan a certain rate of appreciation with 
respect to transferred assets.
131
  These modern strategies can only suc-
ceed if the property transferred consists of appreciating, potentially 
volatile assets – and, moreover, that those assets do indeed appre-
ciate, volatility notwithstanding.  These families understand the ele-
ment of risk that was in play in making their fortunes and look to 
bring this entrepreneurial mindset to the management of these assets 
going forward.  Fortunately for these families, the modern fiduciary 
duty of care can contemplate an aggressive investment posture on the 
part of a trustee, especially where the trust holds a large portfolio and 
where the time horizon as per the trust terms is long enough.  In-
deed, the new standard of care makes it possible to do with property 
in trust what has rarely been done before
132
—and potentially great 
fortunes do not merely cease to wane but can actually appreciate.  
The only proviso is that the fiduciary must be willing to embrace the 
new standard of fiduciary investment responsibility in all its potential. 
The common law trust has existed for centuries, but only in re-
cent decades has the law governing fiduciary investing done other 
than encourage trustees to conserve trust property.
133
  For many years, 
the trustee’s primary duty was to avoid risk, including the risk inhe-
rent in investing assets for growth.
134
  And a case can be made that 
this risk-averse attitude comported with donors’ expectations, espe-
cially in earlier eras when the asset placed in trust was almost certain-
ly land and the only reason to transfer property to future generations 
in trust rather than outright was to avoid transfer tax.
135
  When the 
likely res ceased to be land and became a portfolio of marketable se-
curities, however, donors and their beneficiaries began to rankle un-
der a law that looked only to conserve assets at nominal value even 
 
 130 See HUGHES, supra note 14, at 116–18. 
 131 Cf. Oshins & Oshins, supra note 105, passim (describing strategies to this end). 
 132 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 43, at 81–93. 
 133 See HUGHES, supra note 14, at 196–99. 
 134 Id. at 96–98. 
 135 Langbein, The Contractarian Basis, supra note 59, at 633. 
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while the purchasing power of those assets declined.  Donors and be-
neficiaries alike noted that between inflation and trustees’ commis-
sions, assets placed in trust dwindled however modest the distribu-
tions to beneficiaries under the trust agreement.
136
 
A. Prudent Man 
This focus on conserving the face value of trust assets was man-
dated under the earlier law governing investment of trust assets, the 
Prudent Man Rule, originating in the 1830 case Harvard College v. 
Amory.
137
  In Amory, the court directed that when investing, trustees 
should proceed as “men of prudence, discretion and intelligence 
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard 
to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the proba-
ble income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be in-
vested.”
138
  Soon canonical, the Prudent Man Rule, with its emphasis 
on capital preservation and distaste for speculation, made its way into 
the Restatement of Trusts
139
 in 1935 and later in 1959 into the Res-
tatement (Second) of Trusts.
140
  Underscoring the duty to preserve 
capital, the Restatement (Second) directed the trustee “to make such 
investments and only such investments as a prudent man would make 
of his own property having in view the preservation of the estate and 
the amount and regularity of the income to be derived . . . .”
141
 
Under the Prudent Man Rule, the methodology of risk assess-
ment required the trustee to weigh each asset in isolation rather than 
as an element of a larger portfolio.
142
  This approach had the conse-
 
 136 See id. at 638–40. 
 137 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461.  Amory augured a degree of progress, however, as 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most states mandated that trustees 
confine their investment discretion to a statutory list of investments suitable for trus-
tees—usually government bonds, first mortgages, and preferred stocks.  King v. Tal-
bot, 40 N.Y. 76, 88–90 (1869).   Even common stock was severely discouraged.  Id. at 
89.  “The Massachusetts rule represented a great advance by abandoning the attempt 
to specify approved types of investment.”  Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, 
supra note 59, at 644.  Finally, between the 1930s through the 1960s, “a majority of 
states replaced legal list statutes with the Prudent Man Rule.”  Jesse Dukeminier & 
James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1336 (2003).   
 138 Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 461. 
 139 RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 227 (1935). 
 140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959). 
 141 Id.; see also Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 59, at 644–45 
(discussing this rule). 
 142 Jerold L. Horn, Prudent Investor Rule, Modern Portfolio Theory, and Private Trusts: 
Drafting and Administration Including the “Give-Me-Five” Unitrust, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 1, 7 (1998). 
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quence of prohibiting certain investments entirely and rendering 
others (such as U.S. Treasuries where principal was for all intents and 
purposes guaranteed) inherently safe.  Furthermore, trustees shied 
away from new types of investments.
143
  And delegation of investment 
authority (something that the introduction of new types of invest-
ments might require) was simply verboten.
144
 
B. Prudent Investor 
About twenty years ago, however, the law governing the invest-
ment of trust assets began to change.  Sophisticated studies examin-
ing financial markets in light of modern “portfolio theory” suggested 
that complaints of settlors and beneficiaries bespoke economic reali-
ty, especially once trusts were no longer invested in land but rather in 
marketable securities.  The law responded with a new standard to go-
vern the investment of trust funds.  Thus, Prudent Investor sup-
planted Prudent Man.
145
 
As a theory of efficient markets, modern portfolio theory pro-
vided a new understanding of the risk inherent in investing (includ-
ing investing in trust) and suggested a new methodology by which to 
manage it.  At its core, efficient market theory teaches us that it is im-
possible to predict which securities will do better or worse.
146
  Simply 
stated, each security has risks.  Even an investment (such as a U.S. 
Treasury bill) seeming to conserve trust principal at its face value is 
itself not without risk—if nothing else, the risk of inflation .
147
  All that 
can be done with respect to risk is to manage it. 
Managing risk begins by appreciating that every security is sub-
ject to risk of two types.
148
  Market risk plagues all securities indiscri-
minately and reflects general economic and political conditions—for 
example, the risk of an attack by a foreign power (such as the attacks 
on September 11, 2001), a general economic downturn (such as the 
current global recession), or a change in interest rates by the Federal 
 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id.; see also Goodwin & McDowell, supra note 66, at 8; Langbein, The Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act, supra note 59, at 650–51. 
 145 See Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 59, at 642.  
 146 Christopher P. Cline, The Uniform Prudent Investor and Principal and Income Acts: 
Changing the Trust Landscape, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611, 613 (2008). 
 147 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 22 (1994); Langbein, The 
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 59, at 649.  
 148 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 23–25 
(2d ed. 1998). 
GOODWIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2010  7:16 PM 
2010] HOW THE RICH STAY RICH 501 
Reserve.
149
  With respect to market risk, little can be done to mitigate 
volatility.
150
  The only comfort lies in recognizing that, when the in-
vestment is made, the market factors this risk into the return.  A 
higher market risk garners a higher rate of return.  Market risk is 
compensated risk.
151
 
In contrast, nonmarket or industry risk is the risk that something 
will affect the fortunes of a particular industry or firm, such as if an 
ore necessary for production of a particular product becomes un-
available.
152
  And within a particular firm, there is the further risk that 
a key person might die unexpectedly or that a fire might make a 
plant inoperable.
153
  Where industry risk is concerned, however, the 
return does not reflect the risk.
154
  The only way to manage industry 
risk is through diversification of investments within a portfolio—
diversification among financial sectors and within financial sectors.
155
 
Thus, given that no one can outsmart the market and that risk is 
inherent in all investing, an investor can only proceed by determin-
ing the level of volatility, including the risk of inflation, that she is 
willing to accept in exchange for the return she hopes to receive.  
This will determine the level of market risk she assumes.  Then, with 
respect to nonmarket risk, an investor must diversify her portfolio 
bearing in mind the level of market risk she has chosen.
156
 
In 1987, there began a fundamental revision in the law govern-
ing the investment of trust property in light of this theory of efficient 
markets.
157
  Especially important were its implications for the concept 
of “prudent investment.”  The American Law Institute started revising 
the Restatement of Trusts in 1991 and released the final text in 
1992.
158
  The Uniform Law Commission followed suit and in 1994 co-
dified the revised Restatement principles as the Uniform Prudent In-
vestor Act.
159
  To date, forty-six states have adopted some version of 
the Uniform Act.
160
 
 
 149 Id. at 22. 
 150 Id. at 24. 
 151 Id. at 23–35. 
 152 Id. at 22. 
 153 Id.  
 154 MACEY, supra note 148, at 25. 
 155 Id. at 23–25. 
 156 Cline, supra note 146, at 613. 
 157 Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 59, at 641.   
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 641.  
 160 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT tbl., 7B U.L.A. 1–2 (1994). 
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In this new era, trust investment law has set aside its preoccupa-
tion with speculation and speculative investments.  “The universe of 
investment products changes incessantly,” the Uniform Act coun-
sels.
161
 
Investments that were at one time thought too risky, such as equi-
ties, or more recently, futures, are now used in fiduciary portfo-
lios.  By contrast, the investment that was at one time thought 
ideal for trusts, the long-term bond, has been discovered to im-
port a level of risk and volatility—in this case, inflation risk—that 
had not been anticipated.
162
 
As part and parcel of this reframing of the concept of prudent invest-
ing, the law also jettisoned the idea that some categories of invest-
ments are per se prudent and others imprudent
163
 in favor of direct-
ing trustees to develop a risk profile appropriate to the particular 
trust in question.
164
  “[T]rust beneficiaries are better protected by . . . 
close attention to risk/return objectives . . . than in attempts to iden-
tify categories of investment that are per se prudent or imprudent.”
165
  
The trustee is now to invest for “risk and return objectives reasonably 
suited to the trust.”
166
  And the degree of risk appropriate for a par-
ticular trust is highly situational.  “[T]olerance for risk varies greatly 
with the financial and other circumstances of the investor, or in the 
case of a trust, with the purposes of the trust and the relevant cir-
cumstances of the beneficiaries.”
167
  Indeed, if the “main purpose” of 
the particular trust “is to support an elderly widow of modest means,” 
that trust “will have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate 
for a young scion of great wealth.”
168
 
But addressing market risk through appropriate risk and return 
objectives is not all the law now requires of fiduciaries.  Industry risk 
is not to be ignored either.  Portfolio theory, when informing the law 
of fiduciary duty, mandates a diversified portfolio.
169
  Although diver-
sification had a place in the old law governing fiduciary investing,
170
 
 
 161 Id. § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 22. 
 162 Id. 
 163 “A trustee may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent 
with the standards of this [Act].”  Id. § 2(e), 7B U.L.A. 20. 
 164 Id. § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 21. 
 165 Id. 
 166 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b), 7B U.L.A. 20. 
 167 Id. § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 21. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. § 3 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 22. 
 170 See, e.g., First Ala. Bank of Huntsville v. Spragins, 515 So. 2d 962 (Ala. 1987).  
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the new law enlarges its significance.  Indeed, the requirement of di-
versification serves in the new law to propel the entire methodology 
of Prudent Investor toward a comprehensive perspective, so that at-
tention focuses on the portfolio as a whole with any particular securi-
ty justifiable only in relation to the rest of the account.
171
  As the Uni-
form Act counsels, “A trustee’s investment and management 
decisions respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in isola-
tion but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole.”
172
  The offi-
cial Comment continues, “An investment that might be imprudent 
standing alone can become prudent if undertaken in sensible rela-
tion to other trust assets, or to other nontrust assets.”
173
  Not only is no 
asset without risk, but also no asset is inherently appropriate or inap-
propriate except in relation to the whole portfolio. 
If the requirement of diversification propels the new regime to-
ward a comprehensive perspective in evaluating risk, this same com-
prehensive perspective can at times argue for a suspension of the re-
quirement of diversification.  That is to say, although diversification is 
central to the methodology of Prudent Investor, even diversification 
can be set aside if under the circumstances it is prudent to do so.
174
 
A final point about the influence of modern portfolio theory on 
the law of fiduciary investing: whereas the Prudent Man statute for-
bade the delegation of fiduciary investment responsibility,
175
 the new 
law is much more tolerant of delegation and even encourages it in 
certain situations.
176
  Such tolerance naturally accompanies the rec-
ognition that any asset is potentially an appropriate investment.  If 
any asset is a possible investment in trust, then a trustee potentially 
needs to be competent with respect to a breadth of possible invest-
ments, including complex, state-of-the-art vehicles heretofore rarely 
found in fiduciary accounts, such as futures, derivatives, private equi-
ty, venture capital, closely held operating companies, and more.  Fur-
ther, in addition to being competent to determine whether any such 
investment was suitable for the account, the fiduciary must also be 
able to manage the asset once it is placed in trust.  Few financial 
 
 171 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b), 7B U.L.A. 20; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. g (1992) (discussing invest-
ment planners’ strategies for diversification). 
 172 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b), 7B U.L.A. 20. 
 173 Id. § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 21 (portfolio standard of care); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 90(c) (2007). 
 174 See infra Part IV.C. 
 175 Goodwin & McDowell, supra note 66, at 10. 
 176 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9, 7B U.L.A. 39–40. 
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managers are sufficiently knowledgeable across the financial spec-
trum to make these decisions across such a range of complex invest-
ments.  Accordingly, if the concept of fiduciary prudence is to be in-
formed by modern portfolio theory without equivocation, the law 
must contemplate delegation of fiduciary investment responsibility to 
specialized managers where at least certain assets are concerned. 
C. Portfolio Theory and the Perpetual Trust 
This new legal order is an invitation to trustees to invest assets in 
ways heretofore unimaginable for property placed in trust, especially 
in the case of a perpetual trust holding a great fortune.  Prudent In-
vestor recognized that the mix of investments and overall risk profile 
appropriate to a particular account must speak to the size of the ac-
count, the terms of the trust instrument, and the situations of benefi-
ciaries.  Because the size of account and the investment horizon now 
matter in determining the magnitude of risk appropriate to a trust 
portfolio, a family that transfers its considerable wealth into a perpe-
tual trust can justify types of securities with magnitudes of risk (and 
potential returns) that could not be justified in a smaller trust or in 
one that would terminate sooner.
177
 
Academic commentators are well aware of the perpetual trust, 
but to date, they tend to view it primarily as a vehicle by which a fami-
ly exploits the repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities by placing its 
property beyond the reach of the transfer tax regime for untold gen-
erations to come.  In addition, this literature contains occasional ref-
erences to the utility of the perpetual trust for asset protection pur-
poses.
178
  These observations are correct, as far as they go.  The real 
significance of the perpetual trust cannot be appreciated, however, 
 
 177 As one commentator explains, it is not risk per se that investors seek to avoid, 
but the substance of risk.  Robert H. Jeffrey, A New Paradigm for Portfolio Risk, J. 
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall 1984, at 33, 33.  What must be avoided is a dependence on 
liquidity when asset values are in a slump.  As the Restatement explains with regard 
to property in trust, 
Risk tolerance largely depends on a combination of the regular distri-
bution requirements of the trust and any irregular distributions that 
may in fact become necessary or appropriate. . . . Thus, these various 
distribution requirements facing the trustee effectively serve to define 
the consequences of the volatility risk with respect to a particular trust. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. e (1992). 
 178 See generally Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP 
Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000) (discussing the 
changes that have come to trusts as a result of the tendency of states toward repeal-
ing or limiting the scope of the Rule Against Perpetuities); Sterk, supra note 80 
(same).  
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until we discern how it can serve the family as a multigenerational in-
vestment vehicle.  Only then can we see how the attributes of tax mi-
nimization and asset protection contribute to the determination of 
the overall risk profile appropriate to the account when portfolio 
theory governs the investment of trust property.  It is here that the 
true value of tax minimization and asset protection lies. 
Arguably then, a trustee of a large perpetual trust can justify 
within the portfolio certain risks that would not be consistent with its 
fiduciary duty in other types of trusts.  Obviously, the risk calculus 
now deemed appropriate to property in trust provides an investment 
advantage to the ultra-wealthy (as compared to the merely affluent) 
who not only have great wealth to place in trust but whose fortunes 
are sufficiently large to fund a trust lasting for multiple generations.  
To say only this, however, would be merely to offer the commonplace 
observation that the rich are afforded opportunities to get richer that 
others do not have.  The claim extends further.  What is noteworthy 
in the case of the perpetual trust is the magnitude of the opportunity.  
At this juncture, we can begin to discern how the tax saved when a 
large fortune is placed in a perpetual trust becomes truly valuable.  As 
important as the elimination of a tax burden might have been in an 
era when trusts were invested to preserve the face value of assets, 
where a perpetual trust is invested subject to portfolio theory, the tax 
saved contributes to the size of the res going forward—and supports 
the continued justification under the law for investing at least some 
portion of the account in aggressive or even speculative securities.  As 
tax is saved with each generation and returns consistent with the risk 
profile of the account are realized, the perpetual trust potentially be-
comes an investment juggernaut.  Savings achieved when creditors’ 
claims are avoided contribute here as well. 
In short, when applied to the res of a large perpetual trust, port-
folio theory legitimates, and indeed encourages, an entrepreneurial 
mindset in a fiduciary that would have been unthinkable in earlier 
eras.  For the family establishing a perpetual trust to realize the in-
vestment potential that a more sophisticated understanding of risk 
might offer, however, the trustee becomes a crucial figure.  Even in 
the face of changes in the law governing fiduciary investment respon-
sibility, however, corporate fiduciaries—big banks—remain very con-
servative when it comes to investing assets in trust.  The theory of effi-
cient markets notwithstanding, a recent study of the investment 
practices of big-bank fiduciaries indicates that Prudent Investor has 
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had at best a modest impact on the way these institutions invest.
179
  It 
might be expected that, in the wake of Prudent Investor, trust portfo-
lios at these institutions would at a minimum exhibit a significant 
percentage shift away from assets where face value is more secure but 
returns are limited (debt) toward more volatile assets where return 
would be greater (common stock).  Since the advent of Prudent In-
vestor, however, this shift has occurred only to a modest degree.
180
 
But wealthy families seeking to grow their assets in trust are look-
ing for more than a shift from debt to equity.  Take, for example, the 
risk inherent in a decision to hold a concentrated position—that is, 
to maintain a trust wholly or partially undiversified.  Whereas the very 
wealthy may welcome an investment methodology that sanctions ref-
erence to the trust portfolio as a whole, at times these families do not 
want to be encumbered by the finer points of diversification.  Indeed, 
it is not uncommon for a significant portion of the portfolios of the 
very wealthy to be in holdings such as a large block of founder’s stock 
(possibly with a low tax-cost basis) or a closely held operating compa-
ny.
181
  While there is no doubt that Prudent Investor places a pre-
mium on diversification, an argument can be made that would allow 
a liberal reading of this requirement, especially where assets are held 
in a large perpetual trust.  First of all, the Uniform Act is only a de-
fault regime.
182
  But further, even the default rule explicitly allows for 
an exception where “the trustee reasonably determines that, because 
of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served 
without diversifying.”
183
  Within a large perpetual trust, a case can be 
 
 179 See generally Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent 
Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & ECON. 681 (2007) (in-
vestigating the effect of changes in state prudent trust investment laws on asset allo-
cation in noncommercial trusts).  Using state- and institution-level data from 1986–
1997, the writers found that after adoption of the new prudent-investor rule, institu-
tional trustees held about 1.5–4.5 percent more stock at the expense of “safe” in-
vestments.  Id. at 707. 
 180 Id. at 707. 
 181 Cf. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 59, at 658 (discussing 
the difficulties that small investors face when attempting to diversify a portfolio). 
 182 Cline, supra note 146, at 635. 
 183 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3, 7B U.L.A. 29 (1994); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(b) (1992) (“[T]he trustee has a 
duty to diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the circumstances, it is 
prudent not to do so.”).  The Comments further elaborate,   
The objective of prudent risk management imposes on the trustee a 
duty to diversify trust investments unless, under the circumstances, the 
objectives of both prudent risk management and impartiality can be sa-
tisfied without doing so, or unless special considerations make it pru-
dent not to diversify in the particular trust situation.   
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made that a trustee can justify certain risks that might otherwise be 
inconsistent with its fiduciary duty. 
Nevertheless, big banks remain reluctant to hold concentrated 
positions, especially in assets that are illiquid for which there is little 
to no market, assets that are common among the significant holdings 
of the wealthy (like closely held companies).
184
  Against a more liberal 
reading of Prudent Investor, these institutions argue that their con-
servative posture is consonant with current law.
185
  First and most basi-
cally, Prudent Investor is of relatively recent vintage (so the argument 
goes), and thus there is relatively little case law to underscore the 
Uniform Act or to inform its application in myriad particular situa-
tions.
186
  Indeed, where interpretive authority is not available, some 
commentators are inclined to fall back on case law arising under the 
Prudent Man statute to inform the category of “prudence.”
187
  
Second, what case law there is under the new regime still calls into 
question the extent to which a trustee can decide not to diversify, 
even where the concentrated position is authorized under the trust 
agreement.
188
  Finally, the Restatement is more explicitly conservative, 
stating that “trust provisions are strictly construed against dispensing 
with [the requirement of diversification] altogether.”
189
  Even where 
the trustee is authorized with respect to a concentrated position, such 
a provision does not “relieve the trustee of the fundamental duty to 
act with prudence,”
190
 nor does authorization to hold a particular in-
 
Id. cmt. g. 
 184 See Oshins & Oshins, supra note 105, at 68.   
 185 See Stewart Sterk Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent In-
vestment Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming July 2010). 
 186 See Cline, supra note 146, at 620. 
 187 See id. at 620–23; see also First Ala. Bank of Huntsville v. Spragins 515 So. 2d 962, 
964 (Ala. 1987) (finding against the trustee that boilerplate language was not suffi-
cient to justify undiversified concentrations of anything, although the Alabama Pru-
dent Man Statute is generally taken to rely on general principles of fiduciary invest-
ing).    
 188 See, e.g., In re Trusteeship of Williams, 591 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999), aff’d on reh’g, 631 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (exculpation clause did 
not protect trustee where only partially diversified concentrated stock holding ex-
isted); In re Strong, 734 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669–70 (App. Div. 2001) (trustee prevailed 
against beneficiary alleging improper diversification despite authorization in the 
trust instrument to hold a concentrated position); Fifth Third Bank v. Firstar Bank, 
N.A., No. C-050518, 2006 WL 2520329, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2006) (finding 
against trustee who retained assets not normally suitable in trust, notwithstanding 
exculpation clause in trust instrument).  For a general discussion of these cases and 
others, see Cline, supra note 146. 
 189 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 91 cmt. f (2007). 
 190 Id. 
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vestment and not diversify a portfolio “constitute an exculpatory 
clause.”
191
 
The debate about inferences legitimately drawn from the Uni-
form Act notwithstanding, the very wealthy have in important re-
spects moved on.  For them, where investing for a large perpetual 
trust is concerned, genuine diversification involves deeper, more so-
phisticated issues than merely the appropriate allocation between 
fixed income and equity or a decision to hold a concentrated posi-
tion.  The very wealthy now appreciate that, in a large portfolio, ge-
nuine diversification requires representation of different investment 
philosophies and the inclusion of investments as wide-ranging as 
hedge funds, private equity, venture capital funds, and real estate—
interests not traded in the public securities markets.  Indeed, to real-
ize the full potential of portfolio theory for purposes of these fami-
lies, the trustee needs access to state-of-the-art investment opportuni-
ties (vehicles not likely to be publicly traded), together with the 
specialized knowledge to assess risk with respect to such holdings.  
Large institutional trustees now typically offer a platform of such in-
vestments,
192
 but even this menu may not satisfy an entrepreneurial 
family willing to search the world for opportunities. 
With the advent of Prudent Investor, these families began to 
press big-bank fiduciaries to accept outside managers, encouraging 
them to delegate investment responsibility, especially for purposes of 
state-of-the-art assets.
193
  If Prudent Investor not only tolerates delega-
tion of fiduciary investment responsibility but would even appear to 
encourage it in certain situations,
194
 delegation remains a controver-
sial matter for the big-bank trustee (like so many apparently liberaliz-
ing aspects of Prudent Investor).  This is because the initial decision 
to delegate, as well as all subsequent decisions with respect to the 
delegation, are fiduciary acts carrying with them fiduciary liability.
195
  
The Prudent Investor Rule is clear that the trustee must have good 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 See, e.g., Citi Private Bank, Investing, https://www.privatebank.citibank.com/ 
our_services/individuals_families/investing.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2010). 
 193 See Goodwin & McDowell, supra note 66, at 8.  A number of years ago, Forbes 
magazine in its issue on “The 400” reported that, while approximately ninety percent 
of the clients of a major money center bank allowed that institution to manage all of 
their money about ten years ago, now seventy percent of these clients use multiple 
managers.  Robert Lenzner & Scott McCormack, Achieving Immortality via the Family 
Office, FORBES, Oct. 12, 1998, at 47, 52. 
 194 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9, 7B U.L.A. 39–40 (1994). 
 195 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 (1992). 
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reasons to delegate.
196
  Once a sufficient rationale for delegation has 
been developed, the fiduciary is responsible for the choice of the 
agent.
197
  And after the agent is selected, the fiduciary must continue 
to exercise discretion, establishing the scope and terms of delegation 
and conducting periodic reviews.
198
  The Restatement takes a similar 
position.
199
  Regulations issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the regulatory authority for federally chartered banks, 
sound a similar theme, expressly providing that a bank that delegates 
its authority over investments is nevertheless deemed to retain “in-
vestment discretion.”
200
 
Finally, in those instances where the stars align sufficiently so as 
to justify delegation of fiduciary investment responsibility, the total 
fees to the trust are likely to be as much as twice the fee that the fidu-
ciary would otherwise charge.
201
  Fees charged by big-bank fiduciaries 
have long been a source of irritation to wealthy families, and the 
prospect of paying double makes for a special frustration.
202
  While 
the family might anticipate that the presence of the outside adviser 
would result in a commensurate reduction in the trustee’s fee, the 
need for ongoing exercise of fiduciary discretion (along with the at-
tendant liability) provides continuing justification for the bank to 
impose its standard fee (or something close to it).  And this is the 
 
 196 See id. § 227 cmt. j. 
 197 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(a)(1), 7B U.L.A. 39. 
 198 Id. § 9(a)(2)–(3), 7B U.L.A. 39–40. 
 199 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171.  Again, the 
Restatement sounds the more conservative note: in the act of delegating, the trustee 
must act responsibly.  See id.  “In deciding whether, to whom and in what manner to 
delegate fiduciary authority in the administration of a trust, and thereafter in super-
vising agents, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to exercise fiduciary dis-
cretion and to act as a prudent person would act in similar circumstances.”  Id.  The 
Comments would have a trustee (1) determine what investment responsibilities to 
delegate, (2) select an appropriate agent, (3) negotiate the terms of the delegation, 
and (4) monitor the agent’s performance to an appropriate degree under the cir-
cumstances.  See id. § 227 cmt. j. 
 200 See 12 C.F.R. § 9.2(i) (2009).  Under this regulation, a bank is required to con-
duct an initial postacceptance review and annual reviews of all assets of fiduciary ac-
counts for which the bank has investment discretion.  Id. § 9.6(b)–(c).  Furthermore, 
state-chartered banks are directed to heed any state banking regulations bearing 
upon the issue of delegation.  Id. § 9.7(d)–(e). 
 201 Goodwin & McDowell, supra note 66, at 14 n.12. 
 202 Cf. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 149–50 (discussing reasons why families even of 
substantial means might consider a PTC over a large bank). 
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case, even though an outside agent is providing day-to-day manage-
ment of certain assets.
203
 
If the theory of efficient markets has come to inform the legal 
standards governing the investment of property in trust, what it has 
put in place is as much an art as it is a science.  Gone are the bright-
line tests that separated the investment wheat and chaff into the se-
cure and the speculative.  Now, at least at the margins—and large 
perpetual trusts are at the margins—fiduciaries may disagree as to the 
level of risk appropriate to an account.  And it is for this reason that 
many families establishing large perpetual trusts want to place a pri-
vately owned, family trust company at the helm.  The complete reali-
zation of the potential of portfolio theory when applied to a trust res 
ultimately depends on the trustee’s calculus of risk, both in light of 
an interpretation of the trust instrument and the beneficiaries’ situa-
tions.  For the family establishing a perpetual trust to realize the in-
vestment potential that a more sophisticated understanding of risk 
might offer, the trustee is all important. 
V. FINANCIAL REPRODUCTION AND THE FAMILY TRUST COMPANY 
While establishing a family trust company might appear to be 
the final frontier in securing a fortune long into the future, more is 
required.  If wealthy families are going to take unto themselves the 
role of fiduciary, in order to bring a sophisticated understanding of 
risk to bear on trusts designed as multi-generational investment ve-
hicles, family members must be prepared to oversee the day-to-day 
management of an ongoing enterprise, not the least of which in-
cludes making state-of-the-art investment decisions.  In creating a 
family trust company and making it trustee of family trusts, financial 
entropy will not be averted, and indeed much of the family’s financial 
security is sure to be jeopardized, unless at least some family mem-
bers are ready, willing, and able to undertake the considerable re-
sponsibility of managing the trust company.  Further, given that the 
investment horizon here is multigenerational, this need for financial 
acumen and indeed personal discipline is also multigenerational.  
Ensuring that every generation has at least some family members 
prepared to bring facilitating attitudes about money, investing and 
risk to bear on the family fortune requires attention within the family 
 
 203 Moreover, the fees not only discourage the family from pursuing delegation 
(and the accompanying introduction of state-of-the-art investment vehicles), but they 
also factor into the initial exercise of discretion in deciding to delegate, as Prudent 
Investor also imposes a duty to minimize costs.  See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 
cmt., 7B U.L.A. 42 (1994); Goodwin & McDowell, supra note 66, at 10, 12. 
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to the cultivation of such attitudes from generation to generation.
204
  
Absent sustained talent and discipline, the slow, steady, downward 
trajectory of the trust portfolios of an earlier era will soon in retros-
pect bespeak a golden era in the financial life of the family.
205
 
In the face of this need to attend to the intergenerational culti-
vation of attitudes about wealth and investing in addition to mana-
gerial expertise, there has grown up a considerable industry to guide 
the very rich in what might be termed “financial reproduction” or 
“financial parenting”
206
  The literature of this industry puts forward 
various techniques for the transmission of attitudes and perspectives 
calculated to foster prudence and indeed industriousness within the 
family.
207
  But at the end of the day, what this literature counsels is 
that the family that would preserve its fortune must become quite 
self-consciously identified with its wealth.
208
  And further, the family 
that would manage and indeed grow its wealth must effectively com-
mit itself to maintaining this identity as a wealthy family across gener-
ations.
209
  Interestingly, some of the literature even goes so far as to 
draw a parallel between the family that would preserve and grow its 
fortune and a business enterprise. 
210
 
This literature of “financial parenting” often takes as its point of 
departure a phenomenon termed “affluenza”—that is, myriad species 
of self-indulgence and accompanying desuetude that supposedly cha-
racterize the lives of second- and third-generation members of weal-
thy families.
211
  Investment options notwithstanding, it is this self-
 
 204 JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY: THE COMPACT AMONG GENERATIONS 19 (2007). 
 205 See id. at 13–15. 
 206 See generally, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 14, at 181–88.  In at least some of this lite-
rature, attention is also bestowed on nonfinancial attributes of family life, with efforts 
to make the question of money secondary.  See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 204, at 19–
20.  But at the end of the day, these other aspects of family life are present only as a 
factor in the maintenance of great wealth, because what is at stake here is holding on 
to the fortune.  See id. at 15–16. 
 207 See HUGHES, supra note 204, at xxiv–xxvii. 
 208 See id. at 19–20. 
 209 See id. at 16. 
 210 See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 14, at 5–6; see also McClain, supra note 10, at 861–
62 (providing additional discussion and examples of this metaphor). 
 211 See generally JESSIE H. O’NEILL, THE GOLDEN GHETTO: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
AFFLUENCE (1997).  O’Neill was the granddaughter of the former president of Gen-
eral Motors.  Id. at 2–3.  Drawing upon her own experience, she developed the term 
“affluenza” as a summary reference to the flaws often developed by children of the 
very wealthy.  Id. at 37–38; see also Linda C. McClain, supra note 10, at 861 (discussing 
the role of “affluenza” in wealth transfer between generations and attributing the 
term to O’Neill); McDowell, supra note 4, at 43 (attributing part of the popularity of 
family private trust companies to a desire to avoid “affluenza”).  
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indulgence and desuetude (so this literature claims) that ensures 
great fortunes are soon lost and lends truth to the proverb 
“shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations.”
212
 
But for a wealthy family intending to preserve a great fortune (as 
in the instance of a family establishing its own trust company), more 
is necessary than simply stemming the tide of second- and third-
generation social alienation or indeed decadence.
213
  It is not simply a 
matter of inculcating moral and cultural values in children so as to 
create persons capable of responsible personal self-governance.
214
  
What a wealthy family is ultimately about (so this literature counsels) 
is its fortune—not just preserving it, but ideally growing it.  To do 
this, members must appreciate the essential attributes and insights of 
the generation that made the fortune—the enterprising generation.  
Taken together, these attitudes and insights make for a particular 
ethos about wealth and privilege.  The goal is to have later genera-
tions embrace this ethos with a certain consciousness, knowing that 
this set of attitudes—values instrumental in the family’s financial suc-
cess—along with extraordinary wealth, set the family apart in the 
world.  Financial educators serving the very wealthy suggest that they 
engage their “children from an early age in discussions about . . . the 
purpose of family wealth” (a process called “wealth education”).
215
  
The idea is to apprehend the family’s “differentness”—that is, the 
origin of its privilege as well as the character traits, attitudes and poss-
ible expertise that have sustained this privilege (all of which some 
term “the family story”).
216
  Indeed, to underscore the importance of 
this self-conscious identity, one advisor has even likened the multige-
nerational wealthy family to a “tribe.”
217
  “Becoming a tribe requires a 
family to adopt a form of decision making that seeks consensus about 
what actions will likely perpetuate the tribe’s success and thus its sur-
vival.”
218
 
Given that these families are seeking to maintain their wealth far 
into the future,
219
 this education ultimately requires an institutional 
framework, a governance structure that will bring discipline to the 
development of this ethos and then allow for constructive reconside-
 
 212 See HUGHES, supra note 14, at 3. 
 213 See HUGHES, supra note 204, at 15–20. 
 214 See id. at xxvi. 
 215 McClain, supra note 10, at 863. 
 216 HUGHES, supra note 204, at xix; see also HUGHES, supra note 14, at 4, 45. 
 217 See HUGHES, supra note 204, at 102–06. 
 218 Id. at 104. 
 219 See HUGHES, supra note 14, at 8–11. 
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ration of it by subsequent generations.
220
  What is needed is “a long 
series of linked transitions” and a system of family governance that 
will “guide[] the joint decisions family members must make to suc-
cessfully complete those transitions.”
221
 
It is in this way that the Family Mission Statement found its way 
into the literature guiding the very wealthy in their efforts at financial 
reproduction.
222
  Adopted from the corporate world where such 
statements serve to bring specificity and focus to the interactions and 
endeavors of diverse protagonists,
223
 Family Mission Statements were 
first put forward for families of average means; the idea was to cata-
lyze within the family a discussion of its basic values and then “codify” 
them into a constitution of sorts.
224
  This document is to unify families 
around fundamental principles that “get built right into the very 
structure and culture of the family.”
225
  Like any constitution, the 
Family Mission Statement serves as a point of reference as the family 
moves forward.
226
  It can also be revisited and amended in light of 
fundamental changes in the family or the larger world. 
Still embraced by many people of modest means as a tool of the 
broader endeavor of “social reproduction,”
227
 the Family Mission 
Statement has nevertheless acquired a certain edge as wealth educa-
tors now proffer it to the very wealthy in pursuit of the narrower goal 
of “financial reproduction.”
228
  Most basically, these families are ad-
vised that the process of developing such a statement provides a con-
text in which a wealthy family can confront the origin and meaning 
of privilege in its own instance and, further, reinvent itself as a weal-
thy family from generation to generation.
229
  Interestingly, however, 
especially where the very rich are concerned, some of this literature 
draws parallels between the wealthy family seeking continued finan-
 
 220 Id. at 4. 
 221 See HUGHES, supra note 204, at 104. 
 222 See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 14, at 43–46. 
 223 See generally JEFFREY ABRAHAMS, THE MISSION STATEMENT BOOK: 301 CORPORATE 
MISSION STATEMENTS FROM AMERICA’S TOP COMPANIES (1999)  (discussing mission 
statements of top corporations and how they helped focus the corporation’s vision 
and achieve success); PATRICIA JONES & LARRY KAHANER, SAY IT AND LIVE IT: THE 50 
CORPORATE MISSION STATEMENTS THAT HIT THE MARK (1995) (same). 
 224 STEPHEN R. COVEY, THE 7 HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE FAMILIES 72 (1997) 
 225 Id. at 142. 
 226 See id. at 140–42. 
 227 McClain, supra note 10, at 861. 
 228 See HUGHES, supra note 14, at 43. 
 229 See id. at 4. 
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cial prosperity and the well-managed business enterprise.
230
  The 
claim is that the business enterprise provides an apt analogy because, 
like a business, the object of the family is “to organize [its] financial, 
intellectual, and human assets for the purpose of preserving and en-
hancing each of these in succeeding generations.”
231
  One wealth ad-
viser elaborates, “[T]he most important role in the management of 
an enterprise is arranging for orderly succession.”
232
  And further on: 
“Families attempting long-term wealth preservation often don’t un-
derstand that they are businesses and that the techniques of long-term 
succession planning practiced by all other businesses are available to 
them as well.”
233
 
The wealthy family-as-business ceases to be a metaphor, however, 
and becomes a reality when this literature turns to consider the uses 
of the family trust company.  While perhaps not appreciating the 
magnitude of the investment opportunity presented by these entities 
(especially under Prudent Investor), this literature still recognizes 
that the family trust company can serve the family in the mechanics 
of investing—for example, as a consolidation vehicle, allowing all 
family holdings to be managed in one place and subjected to a coor-
dinated, long-term investment strategy.
234
  More interestingly, howev-
er, is the insight in this literature that the family trust company can 
serve as the primary institutional context for the essential tasks of “fi-
nancial reproduction” in all its dimensions and across multiple gen-
erations.
235
  For a very wealthy family, myriad aspects of family life can 
be coordinated through the trust company.  The trust company is a 
“family seat,” a “repository for the family history” with a “perpetual 
life,” a locus for governance of many types to take place, a meeting 
place where the wealthy family interacts and perpetuates its identify 
as a wealthy family.
236
  Most importantly for a family identified with its 
wealth, the family trust company provides a context in which succes-
sive generations can be tutored in long-term wealth preservation con-
sistent with the family’s particular ethos about money and investing, 
perhaps articulated in a Family Mission Statement.  The family trust 
company presents a golden opportunity to put into play the attitudes 
 
 230 See sources cited supra note 210. 
 231 McClain, supra note 10, at 862 (quoting Brett Anderson & Thomas Kostigen, 
The Family Mission Statement, WORTH, Dec. 2003, at 70, 72).  
 232 HUGHES, supra note 14, at 5. 
 233 Id. at 5–6. 
 234 Id. at 150–53. 
 235 See id. at 152–53. 
 236 Id. at 150–53. 
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and skills deemed instrumental to the family’s historic financial suc-
cess.  As successive generations of a family manage their investment 
risk to secure their fortune long into the future, successive genera-
tions are also given opportunity to rediscover and indeed reaffirm 
their “differentness”—their privilege.
237
 
The suggestion that the family trust company can serve as a con-
text within which a wealthy family can develop an ethos about money 
and investing—and ultimately an identity as a wealthy family—
acquires great resonance when considered alongside the opportuni-
ties under the Prudent Investor statute to invest property in trust, es-
pecially where the portfolio is large enough and the time horizon ex-
tended.  To realize the full potential of Prudent Investor as applicable 
to a large perpetual trust, a trustee needs a sophisticated understand-
ing of risk and skills sufficient to choose investments consistent with 
the risk profile.  If a family seeks to take this role through a family 
trust company, these aptitudes must somehow be present in every 
generation going forward.  What the literature of financial reproduc-
tion makes clear, however, is that the development of these aptitudes 
in one generation and the transmission of them to another is (of ne-
cessity) about much more than investing.
238
  As older and younger 
generations of a family come together to play various roles in the 
management of the family fortune—and to exploit the opportunities 
available under Prudent Investor where a fortune is in trust—what is 
also happening is the transmission of an identity as a very wealthy and 
privileged family. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The family trust company must be appreciated as yet another  
step in a succession of developments in the law that uniquely serve 
the very wealthy.  The family trust company positions a wealthy family 
to exploit the elimination of the Rule Against Perpetuities in certain 
states in order to create perpetual trusts, to leverage exemptions from 
or credits against federal transfer tax applicable to transfers into such 
trusts, and, most importantly, to make the most of new laws under 
which the determination of risk for such trusts has become as much 
an art as a science.  In short, relying upon an architecture of complex 
planning techniques, the very wealthy utilize the family trust company 
as the keystone within these strategies to secure their fortunes for un-
told generations to come.   
 
 237 See id. at 150–53. 
 238 See HUGHES, supra note 204, at 14–20; HUGHES, supra note 14, at 4. 
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It is only in the literature of “financial reproduction,”
239
 how-
ever, that the true significance of the family trust company becomes 
apparent.  With the family trust company as capstone, an assemblage 
of complex planning techniques ceases to be a mere paper stratagem, 
a maze of legal formalities that resonate in the Internal Revenue 
Code and in state laws, but that otherwise have little import for the 
lives of the wealthy who put these structures in place.  Once these 
techniques are grounded within the family trust company, they readi-
ly acquire a social dimension.  As family members gather together 
within the family trust company to realize the potential of the com-
plex structures they have put in place, the family is encouraged to 
appreciate the significance of its wealth as well as embrace its privi-
lege.  The literature of financial reproduction suggests that the family 
ultimately secures its fortune by acting within the family trust compa-
ny to make great wealth an integral part of its identity. 
 And what about shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three genera-
tions?  No treatment of the family trust company should come to a 
conclusion without pausing to consider the significance for democra-
cy of structures that permanently secure the very wealthy in their for-
tunes.  If liberty allows for the accumulation of great wealth, then in a 
democracy the forces that operate to dissipate this wealth have long 
been thought salubrious so that, at least over time, citizens remain 
similarly subject to the vicissitudes of fortune.  If this is the case, then 
the potential of the family trust company to forestall the dissipation 
of great wealth, rendering some families secure in ways unimaginable 
for others, is also the potential to locate these families in a world 
apart—precisely what many theorists of democracy would seek to 
avoid.
240
  This is food for thought. 
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